Joined at the hip, but pulling apart? Franco-German relations, the Eurozone crisis and the politics of austerity

Abstract

This article situates analysis of French macroeconomic policy developments under surpluses. Yet, time is an important factor in politics, and these corrosive tendencies are unlikely to generate a change in the Franco-German relation during Hollande's Presidential tenure.

Post-democracy and institutionalized austerity in France: budgetary politics during François Hollande’s presidency

“…Soon after his election, the new French president rather publicly lost the confrontation with Germany over the establishment of Eurobonds and less stringent rules for the Fiscal Compact at his first European Council summit in June 2012 (Clift and Ryner 2014). Instead of seeking to shift the Eurozone away from austerity, the French government became preoccupied by how to manage the ongoing EDP overseen by the Commission.…”

“…The overhaul of EMU in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis that began in 2010 was beholden to an economic narrative that identified public debt as the cause of the crisis (Baldwin et al 2015). Hence, the reforms reducing fiscal autonomy (Glencross 2014) exacerbated the French tension between promoting integration in economic governance and accepting legal constraints on spending decisions; friction in the Franco-German axis reflected the same problem of whether to emphasize policy coordination or austerity (Schild 2013;Clift and Ryner 2014).…”

The Rise and Fall of Merkozy: Franco‐German Bilateralism as a Negotiation Strategy in Eurozone Crisis Management

“…However, while it is beyond doubt that the Franco‐German couple acted as a bilateral engine of European integration, there has been a striking imbalance between Germany and France in terms of economic power and preference attainment throughout the crisis (Interviews 2, 10, 15, 17, 26; Bulmer and Paterson, , pp. 1394f; Clift and Ryner, , pp. 150–154).…”

“…Although France at the outset of the crisis shared some interests with the creditor states (due to its AAA rating, its large share in the funding programmes, and the high exposure of its banks to Southern Member States), its preferences were not identical with those of Germany. Especially regarding the idea of a discretionary ‘ gouvernement économique ’, as opposed to the rule‐based approach preferred by Germany, preferences differed considerably (see Clift and Ryner, , pp. 140–150; Maris and Sklias, , pp.…”

Mister Unpopular: François Hollande and the Exercise of Presidential Leadership, 2012–14

“…In addition, the economic consequences of the financial crisis within the eurozone during the Sarkozy presidency had shown the extent to which the Franco-German axis within the European Union (EU) was becoming increasingly dominated by Germany (Clift and Ryner 2014). Hollande's attempts to push for a greater growth stimulus within the EU at the start of his presidency, and again in 2014, came to nothing as it conflicted with Chancellor Angela Merkel's emphasis on austerity measures.…”