John Stuart Mill and the Harm of Pornography

Abstract

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Reformulating Mill’s Harm Principle

“…For instance, even if the 'stars' of violent pornography consent to their role in its production, society might intervene if it is harmful to other women who do not consent (c.f. Dyzenhaus, 1992;Skipper, 1993;Vernon, 1996).…”

Millian Liberalism and Extreme Pornography

“…The pro‐censorship case argues that this liberal approach endorses metaphysically unjustified “absolute” (McGlynn and Ward , 520), “abstract” (McGlynn and Ward , 339), “ a priori ” (Dyzenhaus b, 546) rights to privacy and free expression and that the liberal approach relies on an impoverished conception of “direct” harm that denies the real harms and injustice of pornographic expression beyond that directly associated with its production (McGlynn and Ward , 503). Once these abstractions are dismissed, those in favor of censorship suggest that liberals can approach questions of free expression and individual liberty on a more contingent, case‐by‐case basis (McGlynn and Ward , 341).…”

Pornography and censorship

“…It must either be shown to directly cause actual physical violence to others (e.g., murder, rape, assault, battery), on a narrower understanding of "harm"; or to deliberately or negligently violate sufficiently important interests or rights of others, on a broader, interest-based conception of "harm". (For further discussion of these different conceptions of harm to others see e.g., Dyzenhaus 1992, Feinberg 1987 Liberals have traditionally defended a right to pornography on three main grounds. (By the "right to pornography" here, and in what follows, I mean the negative right of consenting adults not to be prevented from making, publishing, exhibiting, distributing and consuming pornography in private).…”

“…Inspired by more recent feminist arguments against pornography, some have begun to argue that the liberal commitment to protecting individual autonomy, equality, freedom of expression and other liberal values may in fact support a policy that prohibits certain kinds of pornography, rather than the permissive policy liberals have traditionally favoured. (See e.g., Dyzenhaus 1992, Easton 1994: 42-51, Langton 1990, Okin 1987, West 2003.) These theorists do not normally reject the harm principle, broadly understood: They generally agree that the crucial question in determining whether censorship of pornography is justified is whether there is reliable evidence to show that the publication or viewing of pornography by consenting adults causes sufficiently great harm to the significant interests of others.…”

“…(Easton 1994, Dyzenhaus 1992 Yet another line of feminist argument draws on the work of the prominent liberal philosopher, John Rawls, to suggest that regulation of pornography is justified insofar as rational, self-interested individuals in the original position would not agree to basic social institutions that "asymmetrically either forced or gave strong incentives to members of one sex to become sex objects for the other" (Okin 1987:68). Rae Langton (1990) also seeks to use liberals' own theoretical commitments to make a (liberal) case for the legitimacy of censorship, though her chosen liberal is Ronald Dworkin.…”