Job Matching and On-the-Job Training

Barron, John M.; Black, Dan A.; Loewenstein, Mark A.

doi:10.1086/298196

Cited by 241 publications

(162 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Booth and Zoega (2000) suggest that training helps to attract good quality workers, while Black and Lynch (2005) find that training affects both productivity and pay via its contribution to workplace organization and organizational capital. Of special note for the current paper, Barron et al (1989), Bishop (1994) and Dearden et al (2000) report that productivity gains exceed employees' remuneration gains, which implies the possibility of a positive impact of training on profit but falls short of proving such an impact since there are non-zero direct costs to the investment. Also relevant, Vignoles et al (2004) provide evidence that the returns to training are greater for those chosen to receive it than for those not chosen, suggesting that employers are at least to some extent rational in allocating their training budgets between workers.…”

Section: Previous Evidence On Education Training and Business Pementioning

confidence: 89%

Education, Training and Economic Performance: Evidence from Establishment Survival Data

Collier

Green²,

Kim

et al. 2011

J Labor Res

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may ABSTRACTWe consider the links between training, the quality of labour and establishment performance, using a proxy for performance, commercial survival. We develop a model in which managers have varying beliefs about the efficacy of education and training, leading to potential variation in the optimal provision of education and training. Between 1998 and 2004, 16% of private sector establishments in Britain with at least 5 employees closed down. Our principal new findings are, first, that establishments which train at least some experienced employees in the largest occupational group are 13 percentage points more likely to survive; second, that establishments are more likely to survive if they employ more educated labour; third, however, among establishments that do train, the survival prospects are not altered by the duration of training per employee. We infer from these findings that government policy aimed at encouraging more employer-sponsored training without deploying regulation or subsidy should focus on employers that do not train at all.

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Section: Previous Evidence On Education Training and Business Pementioning

confidence: 89%

Education, Training and Economic Performance: Evidence from Establishment Survival Data

Collier

Green²,

Kim

et al. 2011

J Labor Res

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“…This is because, in addition to developing human capital, this training serves two complementary functions. First, the opportunity to be trained induces self-selection, enabling the agency to recruit employees with valuable unobserved ability (see also Barron et al 1989). Second, it facilitates employee screening by generating private information on the skills and abilities of employees.…”

Section: Prior Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Flexible Contracts and Human Capital Investments

et al. 2011

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As suggested by human capital theory, workers with flexible contracts participate less often in training than those with permanent contracts. We find that this is merely due to the fact that flexworkers receive less employer-funded training, a gap they can only partly compensate for by their own training investments. Flexworkers particularly participate less in firm-specific training that is meant to keep up with new skill demands than workers with permanent contracts. However, for those who participate in employer-funded firm-specific training, a temporary contract appears to facilitate the transition to a permanent contract with the same employer. However, this does not hold for participation in self-paid training. This training, which is usually general training, does not help in finding a better job.

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“…It is assumed that if the field of education obtained by school-leavers corresponds to the field which is required on the work floor, the need for further training is less (Barron, Black and Loewenstein, 1989;Van Smoorenburg and Van der Velden, 2000). Hence, we formulate the hypothesis that school-leavers who work outside their field of education are more likely to participate in additional training than school-leavers who have a job in their own field.…”

Section: Labour Market Effects Of Job Mismatchesmentioning

confidence: 99%