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Hurley, S.L.

doi:10.1023/a:1018763930668

Cited by 12 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Armed with that clearly defined concept they then work out what it would take for agents to meet these requirements; that is, what qualities or capacities a responsible agent would possess . The problem with this approach is twofold; first, the lack of a stable philosophical consensus on precisely what it means to be responsible (Hurley, 2000 ; Vargas, 2021 ), and second, the aforementioned empirical challenges from the cognitive sciences to the knowledge and control conditions that have long been assumed to be central to any acceptable candidate for a consensus definition.…”

Section: Revising the Responsibility Concept: From Agency Possession ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Find the Gap: AI, Responsible Agency and Vulnerability

Vallor,

Vierkant

2024

Minds & Machines

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The responsibility gap, commonly described as a core challenge for the effective governance of, and trust in, AI and autonomous systems (AI/AS), is traditionally associated with a failure of the epistemic and/or the control condition of moral responsibility: the ability to know what we are doing and exercise competent control over this doing. Yet these two conditions are a red herring when it comes to understanding the responsibility challenges presented by AI/AS, since evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that individual humans face very similar responsibility challenges with regard to these two conditions. While the problems of epistemic opacity and attenuated behaviour control are not unique to AI/AS technologies (though they can be exacerbated by them), we show that we can learn important lessons for AI/AS development and governance from how philosophers have recently revised the traditional concept of moral responsibility in response to these challenges to responsible human agency from the cognitive sciences. The resulting instrumentalist views of responsibility, which emphasize the forward-looking and flexible role of agency cultivation, hold considerable promise for integrating AI/AS into a healthy moral ecology. We note that there nevertheless is a gap in AI/AS responsibility that has yet to be extensively studied and addressed, one grounded in a relational asymmetry of vulnerability between human agents and sociotechnical systems like AI/AS. In the conclusion of this paper we note that attention to this vulnerability gap must inform and enable future attempts to construct trustworthy AI/AS systems and preserve the conditions for responsible human agency.

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Section: Revising the Responsibility Concept: From Agency Possession ...mentioning

confidence: 99%