Japan’s South China Sea Policy and Regional Subcomplex Expansion: Toward Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Abstract

This research aims to investigate Japan’s motivation to be involved in the South China Sea dispute despite Japan’s far distance from the conflicted area. Utilizing the qualitative research method, this research analyzes Japanese Government official documents and relevant literature to achieve the research objective. The research discovers that Japan’s main interest in the South China Sea is to articulate a safer maritime lane for the sake of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific agenda by balancing China’s assertiveness in the region. Employing a regional security complex framework, this research sees that Japan, by its presence in the South China Sea, tries to intensify the security interaction with Southeast Asian counterparts to expand the Northeast Asian regional subcomplex, aiming to strengthen the perception of China as a threat to Southeast Asian countries. The South China Sea involvement will fortify Japan’s security interlink with Southeast Asian counterparts, balancing China’s expansive trait in the maritime zone, accelerating Tokyo-initiated Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.

Japan in the South China Sea: Restricted yet Strategic?

“…Amid the question of the U.S.' commitment, Abe decided to seek other alternatives to secure the SCS through strengthening security ties with like-minded countriesor those who have similar threat perceptions on the SCS. The arrow points to Southeast Asian countries which have acknowledged Japan's contribution to defending the region (Irsadanar, 2020). This might or might not relate to Japan's interest in reintegrating with Southeast Asia after colonization.…”

“…Additional technical support has been delivered under Abe's administration, either through training or even weaponizing claimants, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Military equipment donations were contributed to these three countriespatrol boats to Vietnam, vessels to Indonesia, and patrol aircraft to the Philippines (Irsadanar, 2020).…”

“…This approach feels like a handover of help from the US grace to Japan. Japan has also been arranging coordination and capacity building through military exercises in the Malacca Strait and assembling the Vientiane Vision to formalize Japan's contribution to the FOIP mission and secure the SCS (Irsadanar, 2020). Perhaps Japan's power is more advanced than these littoral states, making it a strategic move for them to accept assistance.…”