Japan and the Theory of International Leadership

Abstract

This essay makes four points: (1) despite the assertions of some of their proponents, static game-theoretic and optimal-tariff arguments suggest that states should not undertake hegemonic responsibilities to maintain an open trading system; (2) hegemonic states have, in fact, cooperated with others, despite risks to themselves; (3) Japan, the hegemonic successor or condominial associate of the United States in the years to come, is also likely to cooperate to prevent the collapse of the international trading system. This means (4) that hegemonic or near-hegemonic powers have either acted irrationally or that their calculations have rested upon a different and more dynamic rational foundation. Specifically, systemic as well as domestic considerations have influenced their thinking and determined their policies. A major creditor power like Japan must find means of allowing others to earn surpluses in its own market or of providing assistance on concessional terms.

The Belt and Road Initiative in China's Emerging Grand Strategy of Connective Leadership

“…Hegemony has a negative connotation in the Chinese context and China has a deep-seated "counter-hegemonic foreign policy orientation" (Leverett and Wu, 2016, p. 113), which advocates multipolarism as a preferable system with less concentration of power. Faced with the reality of an increasingly reluctant hegemon that has ceased to rise relative to the other powers in the system, Beijing knows that it is generally not in the best interests of rising competitors to support a declining leader: in theory, they would be best served by a strategy of relative gain seeking while the hegemon continues to bear most of the costs of system maintenance (Rosecrance and Taw, 1990). However, at a deeper level, Chinese elites are nervous at the prospect of the USA becoming a potential freerider and choosing populist nationalism over global engagement (Nye, 2016).…”

Japanese Foreign Policy: No Longer Reactive?

“…3See Prestowitz, 1988; Rosecrance and Taw, 1990; Akaha and Langdon, 1993; Fallows, 1994; Garby and Bullock, 1993, to name a few.…”

Systematic Leadership and Trade Openness

“…Or, it may be that the most capital-abundant economies seek to encourage the retention of capital-intensive industries and that the hegemon's lead means that it does not have to try as hard as other economies to protect its industries (Lake, 1988). A third thread (Frieden, 1988;Rosecrance and Taw, 1990;Brawley, 1993) emphasizes the emergence of domestic groups within hegemons with incentives to foster free trade. If those groups become sufficiently powerful, they will encourage their governments as well as other governments to pursue free trade.…”