IX-Perceptual Activity and Bodily Awareness

Richardson, Louise

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00389.x

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…26 27 What I am suggesting, then, is that it is one and the same feature of the phenomenology of perceptual experience that can explain the appeal both behind the thought that the temporal properties of experience constitute an exception to transparency, and behind the thought that the present is somehow metaphysi-24. Or, more specifically, what Richardson (2015) refers to as the 'Strawsonian enabling conditions' because of the special place they have in Strawson's (1974) account of perception. They contrast with other enabling conditions of perception that have to do, for instance, with having an intact visual system.…”

Section: Understanding the Connection -A Suggestionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experience and Time: Transparency and Presence

Hoerl¹

2018

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Philosophers frequently comment on the intimate connection there is between something's being present in perceptual experience (call this experiential presence) and that thing's being, or at least appearing to be, temporally present (call this temporal presence). Yet, there is relatively little existing work that goes beyond asserting such a connection and instead examines its specific nature. In this paper, I suggest that we can make progress on the latter by looking at two more specific debates that have hitherto been conducted largely in isolation from each other: one about the nature of conscious experience and one about the nature of time itself. The first concerns the extent to which the temporal properties of experience form an exception to the transparency of experience, meaning that introspection can provide support for one particular view of how experience itself is structured temporally; the second concerns the question as to whether there is something about experience that gives us grounds for thinking that the present is somehow metaphysically special. As I argue, the idea of a connection between experiential presence and temporal presence plays a key background role in each of these debates. Yet it can also, in each of them, be seen to draw one side towards making claims that are supposed to express an important truth but are at the same time, on the face of it, self-contradictory. In each case, resolving what it actually is that these claims are trying to get at turns on recognizing a distinctive feature of perceptual experience, which I refer to as its lack of temporal viewpointedness. Recognising this feature also helps in making sense of what the issues at stake actually are in the intuition of an intimate connection between experiential presence and temporal presence. P hilosophers frequently comment on the intimate connection there is between something's being present in perceptual experience and that thing's being (or at least appearing to be) temporally present. 1 Brian O'Shaughnessy (2000:1. It is a familiar point that, due to the finite speed of light and sound, there is in fact a time-lag before distal events impinge upon our senses, though in the context of ordinary interactions with

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Section: Understanding the Connection -A Suggestionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experience and Time: Transparency and Presence

Hoerl¹

2018

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…The sameness of grounds condition states that the grounds exploited by the judging subject in these cases must be somatosensory perception. This is to say that they must 6 See, e.g., Armstrong (1962), Pitcher (1970, O'Shaugnessy (1980, vol 1, chap 5), Martin (1995), Tye (1995Tye ( , 1997, Bermúdez (1998), Dretske (1995Dretske ( , 1999, Crane (2003), Smith (2006), O'Brien (2007, chap 10), Schwenkler (2013), de Vignemont (2015, § 3), Richardson (2015). be of the very same kind as the grounds we normally exploit when we form judgements about our bodies by perceiving them 'from the inside'.…”

Section: Sameness Of Grounds Conditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Crossed Wires about Crossed Wires: Somatosensation and Immunity to Error through Misidentification

Salje

2017

Dialectica

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Suppose that the following describes an intelligible scenario. A subject is wired up to another's body in such a way that she has bodily experiences ‘as from the inside’ caused by states and events in the other body, that are subjectively indistinguishable from ordinary somatosensory perception of her own body. The supposed intelligibility of such so‐called crossed wire cases constitutes a significant challenge to the claim that our somatosensory judgements are immune to error through misidentification relative to uses of the first person pronoun. After all, the subject in this case is liable to commit precisely the sort of error ruled out by such a claim. In this paper I argue that the proponent of this challenge must establish at least two things: that the subject is committing an error of misidentification, and that her judgement shares its epistemic grounds with our ordinary somatosensory judgements. Neither condition, I argue, can be reached from the stipulations permitted into the starting descriptions of the cases.

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What is Proprioception?

Liao¹

2022

FHSS

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This paper aims to explore the particularity of proprioception. Because of its internality, inseparable descriptiveness and ‘need no proof’ characteristics, it is different from perceptual knowledge, and because of its non-intentional, it is different from practical knowledge. Besides, as the intermediary of mind and body, it provides an important foundation for mind and external perception and intentional action.

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IX-Perceptual Activity and Bodily Awareness

Cited by 3 publications

References 10 publications

Experience and Time: Transparency and Presence

Experience and Time: Transparency and Presence

Crossed Wires about Crossed Wires: Somatosensation and Immunity to Error through Misidentification

What is Proprioception?

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