Iterations of Olympic security: Montreal and Vancouver

Abstract

This article compares security dynamics at two Olympic Games hosted by Canada: Montreal (1976) and Vancouver (2010). It is the first study of security at the Montreal Olympics and was only made possible after four years of requests under the Access to Information Act that resulted in the release of thousands of classified security documents in French and English. A comparative study of the two largest peacetime security operations in Canadian history offers unique insights into the challenges of hosting a major international gathering in the aftermath of an international terrorist incident: the 1972 Munich massacre and the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. The comparison further offers an opportunity to chart the continuities and differences in Olympic security over time. We focus in part on how the historical context of each event informed 'imaginaries of disaster'. We also examine continuities in the official security response, such as the emphasis on advance intelligence gathering, security 'mock-ups', manpower allocation, coalitions of security agencies and technological innovation. We conclude with some considerations on security legacies and the importance of major event security as a subject of comparative inquiry.

‘The more, the merrier?’ Euro 2020, transnational collaboration, opportunities and challenges

“…However, as Whelan (2014) argues, coordination becomes increasingly tricky in an SME setting, where the security performance and deliveries are under the scrutiny of the watchful eye of the public. Moreover, inter-organizational tensions between law enforcements, security agencies and professionals with responsibilities for security, actors' own interests and rules of engagement may add to this (Boyle et al, 2015;Fussey, 2015;Klauser, 2015;Taylor & Toohey, 2015;Whelan & Molnar, 2019). 7 Collaboration between actors simply cannot be achieved by establishing a network (Whelan, 2016), whilst cooperation does not automatically translate into trust between actors within the network (Klauser, 2015;Whelan, 2015).…”

“…Introduction nations that are directly involved in the event's overall security delivery. Moreover, the emphasis placed on 'intensive collaboration' is worth noticing, since it previously has been argued that security networks in SME settings may be impacted by inter-organizational tensions and obstacles (Boyle et al, 2015;Fussey, 2015;Taylor & Toohey, 2015;Whelan & Molnar, 2019). In short, Euro 2020's high number of security actors may, therefore, potentially construct a situation in which 'too many cooks spoil the broth'.…”

Crowd surveillance: The (in)securitization of the urban body

“…The crowd behaviour analysis technology, as officially announced (Tokyo 2020, 2015), is to be launched more extensively at the 2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games following the Olympic organizing committee concluding a contract with NEC for providing security infrastructure. The Olympic Gamesparticularly after the 1972 Munich massacre and the 2001 September 11 terrorist attacksarguably involve the most thorough security planning outside warfare and are considered to be an important site of analysis for understanding contemporary security dynamics (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009;Boyle et al, 2015). In this concluding section, this article reflects on the introduction of crowd surveillance in the Tokyo Olympic security planning and addresses its impacts on contemporary security at border control.…”