Italy's embrace of the Belt and Road Initiative: populist foreign policy and political marketing

Abstract

Are populist governments harbingers of foreign policy disruption? The foreign policy of western Europe's first all-out populist coalition government constitutes a good window to address this question. Italy's ‘Yellow–Green’ government's decision to embrace China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019 has been understood as an important rupture from Italy's traditional Euro-Atlantic foreign policy. On the basis of substantial empirical research, especially elite interviews and official documentation, this article finds instead continuity with previous administrations' overtures to Beijing, including non-opposition from the EU and active engagement by the bureaucratic establishment. This article makes a contribution to the study of populism and foreign policy by positing that political marketing constitutes the key intervening variable that accounts for populist governments' rhetorical differentiation to local electorate and international counterparts alike. The Italian case demonstrates that populist ‘ruptures’ may well be about style and electioneering tactics, over substance and policy strategy. Considering the still growing number of governments that decide to sign into the BRI, most lately that of Argentina, policy-makers and observers ought to assess to what extent these are real commitments, or rather a smokescreen of marketing practices that does not change the relationship between China and the target country in any substantial manner.

Varieties of Anti‐Globalism: The Italian Government’s Evolving Stance on the EU’s Investment Screening Mechanism

“…Others have pointed to the presence of political entrepreneurs within the government, especially Minister Tria and Undersecretary Geraci, who were vocal in pushing for a partnership with Beijing. Others contend that as early as 2015 (well before the yellow-green government), Italy's diplomatic apparatus was already heavily involved in courting Chinese investment and that Euro-Atlantic governments were the first to actually open up to Chinese investment in infrastructure and strategic companies (Pugliese et al, 2022; see also Andornino, 2023). In any case, proximity to China is seen by many as the main reason why the Five Star Movement favored the vote of abstention when the EU-wide FDI screening mechanism was voted in 2019.…”

Strategic partnerships and China’s diplomacy in Europe: Insights from Italy

“…Italy’s motivations behind the SP are primarily economic, and China has been seen by Italian policymakers and businesses through a three-fold lens: (1) as a potentially profitable export market; (2) as competitor in the manufacturing sector; and (3) as a potential source of investments, especially following the financial crisis in the Eurozone (Dossi, 2020). These three factors are key to understanding the signing of the MoU on the BRI in March 2019, spearheaded by the Five Star Movement, one of Italy’s governing parties between 2018 and 2022 (Pugliese et al, 2022). As the then Italian Foreign Minister, Mr Luigi Di Maio, claimed in an interview, ‘in order to help our businesses export the “made in Italy” brand, we have reinforced our relations with a strategic commercial partner like China’ (SkyTg24, Di Maio, 22 April 2020: 3:40–3:49).…”