It’s not just the thought that counts: An experimental study on the hidden cost of giving

Pan, Xiaofei; Xiao, Erte

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.04.005

Cited by 16 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Similar to Abbink et al (2002) and Malmendier and Schmidt (2011), we find that subjects display a reciprocal response when receiving a gift, even if this response is at the expense of third parties, and even though the gift is transparently provided in order to influence their behavior. Other recent work consistent with our findings includes Pan and Xiao (2014), who report that recipients favor a gift giver over a third party even when the third party has incurred the same cost and signaled the same intention of giving, and Strassmair (2009), who presents evidence that recipients' response to a gift does not significantly vary given experimental variation in the extent to which the gift may arise from selfish motives by the giver. Our experimental results suggest that subjects respond robustly to a transfer regardless of whether any quid pro quo is specified, and even though that response is costly both to the recipient of the transfer and to other subjects.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 89%

Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability

Leight¹,

Foarta²,

Pande³

et al. 2018

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 89%

Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability

Leight¹,

Foarta²,

Pande³

et al. 2018

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“…Charness & Levine (2007) find that the first player's intention has a large effect on the second player's decision, while the decision outcome only has a minor effect. 2 However, note that this finding is contested by the results in Pan & Xiao (2016) who find that in a gift exchange actual gifts create a larger impulse to reciprocate than intended gifts.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes☆

Friedrichsen

Momsen

Piasenti

2022

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

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“…A second explanation could be that, contrary to a dictator game, the sender does not have full control over the outcome, as it is the receiver that makes the ultimate decision. In such cases, the sender's intentions (e.g., to deceive someone else) are weighted as less important (see Pan and Xiao, 2014). This probably reduces the sender's feeling of responsibility.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dishonesty under scrutiny

Ven

Villeval

2015

J Econ Sci Assoc

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy's (2005) deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender's identity to the observer. The option for observers to communicate with the sender, and the option to reveal the sender's lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to their observer do not lie less when their interests are misaligned with those of the observer.

show abstract

It’s not just the thought that counts: An experimental study on the hidden cost of giving

Cited by 16 publications

References 21 publications

Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability

Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability

Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes☆

Dishonesty under scrutiny

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