It’s Complicated: What Our Attitudes toward Pregnancy, Abortion, and Miscarriage Tell Us about the Moral Status of Early Fetuses

Chambers, K. Lindsey

doi:10.1017/can.2020.48

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Harman’s position, however, is disputed in the literature on pregnancy loss (Parsons 2010 ; Lindemann 2013 ; Wright 2018 ; Chambers 2020 ). Here authors argue that the lived experience of those who have lost (through natural or unnatural means) a wanted pregnancy is radically distinct from those who have lost (actively or passively) their unwanted foetuses.…”

Section: The Challenges Of Personhood In Abortion Debatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To Kelsey, it is personal relations that come before persons. We are personalised by these relationships and as such are created as persons (Chambers 2020 ). Consequently, persons are beings who are ‘called into personhood’ by other persons (cf.…”

Section: Relational Persons Not Conscious Great Apesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These are just three ways in which persons engaged in wanted pregnancies treat their foetus as if it were a person. By giving it a name, announcing it to the community, and preparing a space in the home, the pregnant person personalises their foetus and in these ways engages in the ‘person-creation project’ (Chambers 2020 ). We could mention many other personalising activities: dreaming of their future child, stroking their abdomen, staring at ultrasound pictures, attending pre-natal classes with other persons engaged in the person-creating project etc.…”

Section: Naming Declaring and Placing Early Foetal Personsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Relating to foetal persons: why women’s Voices come first and last, but not alone in Abortion debates

Milford

2023

Med Health Care and Philos

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Abortion remains a controversial topic, with pro-life and pro-choice advocates clashing fiercely. However, public polling demonstrates that the vast majority of the Western public holds a middle position: being in favour of abortion but not in all circumstances nor at any time. The intuitions held by the majority seem to imply a contradiction: two early foetuses at the same point in development have different moral statuses. Providing coherent philosophical grounding for this intuition has proved challenging. Solutions given by philosophers such as Feinberg, Harman and Räsänen are complex and do not fully account for the lived experience of pregnancy loss. This article argues for a relational ontological construction of human personhood as the basis of foetal personhood. This approach takes seriously the literature of pregnancy loss and the lived experiences of pregnant persons. Focusing on the manner in which persons relate to early foetuses (especially pregnant persons), provides a coherent ground for distinct foetal value. Importantly, this approach is both simple and intuitive. Therefore, it can be more easily adopted by middle. To counter an implied equality of human relationality, the article argues for a clear hierarchy based on relational proximity that affirms pregnant persons? primary role in deciding the moral significance of foetal termination.

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Section: The Challenges Of Personhood In Abortion Debatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Relational Persons Not Conscious Great Apesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Naming Declaring and Placing Early Foetal Personsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Relating to foetal persons: why women’s Voices come first and last, but not alone in Abortion debates

Milford

2023

Med Health Care and Philos

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“…For instance, Chambers argues that fetal moral status depends on whether the fetus is someone’s ‘productive end.’ Choosing to become pregnant or to continue a pregnancy generates ethical obligations to the fetus which increases its moral status. Consequently, ‘a being who may not otherwise have moral status on its own can come to have some moral standing in virtue of someone else’s decision or activity’ (p952) 38. Recognising pregnant people’s values and decision-making can engender or deny moral status illuminates why some pregnant people may grieve over a miscarriage while others choose abortion.…”

Section: Relational Approaches To Moral Statusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Clinicians’ criteria for fetal moral status: viability and relationality, not sentience

Campo‐Engelstein

Andaya

2022

J Med Ethics

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The antiabortion movement is increasingly using ostensibly scientific measurements such as ‘fetal heartbeat’ and ‘fetal pain’ to provide ‘objective’ evidence of the moral status of fetuses. However, there is little knowledge on how clinicians conceptualise and operationalise the moral status of fetuses. We interviewed obstetrician/gynaecologists and neonatologists on this topic since their practice regularly includes clinical management of entities of the same gestational age. Contrary to our expectations, there was consensus among clinicians about conceptions of moral status regardless of specialty. First, clinicians tended to take a gradualist approach to moral status during pregnancy as they developed and viewed viability, the ability to live outside of the uterus, as morally significant. Second, in contrast to ‘fetal pain’ laws and philosophical discussions about the ethical salience of sentience, the clinicians in our study did not consider the ability to feel pain as a morally relevant factor in moral status determinations. Third, during previability and perviability, clinicians viewed moral status as a personal value decision, which should be made by pregnant people and parents of neonates.

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Schrödinger’s Fetus and Relational Ontology: Reconciling Three Contradictory Intuitions in Abortion Debates

Milford,

Shaw

2023

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Pro-life and pro-choice advocates battle for rational dominance in abortion debates. Yet, public polling (and general legal opinion) demonstrates the public’s preference for the middle ground: that abortions are acceptable in certain circumstances and during early pregnancy. Implicit in this, are two contradictory intuitions: (1) that we were all early fetuses, and (2) abortion kills no one. To hold these positions together, Harman and Räsänen have argued for the Actual Future Principle (AFP) which distinguishes between fetuses that will develop into persons and those that will never develop into persons. However intellectually ingenious their solutions are, they fail to account for a third intuition: that the death of a wanted fetus – e.g. through termination or miscarriage – is of moral significance. Not only is this practically important, but it is also supported by public opinion. The authors of this paper argue that relational ontology can modify the AFP to better account for all three intuitions. Furthermore, it further emphasizes the pivotal role of the pregnant person who relates to their own fetus in either personal or impersonal ways. Addressing the fundamental challenges of relational ontology, the authors defend the position that human personal identity is ultimately relational.

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It’s Complicated: What Our Attitudes toward Pregnancy, Abortion, and Miscarriage Tell Us about the Moral Status of Early Fetuses

Cited by 3 publications

References 30 publications

Relating to foetal persons: why women’s Voices come first and last, but not alone in Abortion debates

Relating to foetal persons: why women’s Voices come first and last, but not alone in Abortion debates

Clinicians’ criteria for fetal moral status: viability and relationality, not sentience

Schrödinger’s Fetus and Relational Ontology: Reconciling Three Contradictory Intuitions in Abortion Debates

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