Issues Associated with IAEA Involvement in Assured Nuclear Fuel Supply Arrangements

Abstract

state concerning various matters such physical protection, safety and liability, export of the Agency-owned material.One other potential role of the Agency -to certify that a given recipient/customer is in full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations -may not be straightforward. First, it may be difficult to get the BOG to agree on exactly what constitute "nonproliferation obligations". Second, the BOG or Agency Secretariat will need to define what constitutes compliance, or full compliance? Is there a materiality standard --for example, is some minor violation of a safeguards agreement considered noncompliance? If the noncompliance has to be major or significant, how is that criterion defined and compliance measured? Third, the IAEA may not want to get in the business of certifying compliance. The Agency is usually quite guarded in its conclusions with respect to its core mission of safeguards verification. This issue may require considerable IAEA and BOG efforts to resolve.It is our recommendation that the Agency avoid assuming new responsibilities that add very little to fuel supply assurances and would be inappropriate, burdensome, costly, and/or require the Agency to acquire major new skills or capabilities.