Issued by the General Staff: Doctrine Writing at British GHQ, 1917–1918

Abstract

This article exploits the previously unused private papers of the General Headquarters doctrine writers to examine the process by which the British Expeditionary Force’s combat doctrine was produced and the influences upon it. It also reveals SS.198, a hitherto unknown manual from the autumn of 1917, which illustrates Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig’s influence upon doctrine writing at the time of the controversial Third Ypres offensive. It concludes that the doctrinal process raises serious questions about the notion of a consistent ‘learning curve’ within the BEF.

Doctrine for Orders and Decentralization in the British and German Armies, 1885–1935

“…Jim Beach has recently explored the process of doctrinal writing at Haig's GHQ, noting this became more coherent under Cuthbert Headlam from March 1918. 121 From July, Headlam concentrated on a new version of the BEF's core statement of offensive doctrine, 122 the British equivalent of Ludendorff's Die Abwehr and Der Angriff, which like them had gone through several previous editions. 123 A key feature of the manual, finally published in November as SS 135: The Division in Attack, 124 was its 'genuflection' to the pre-war edition of FSR I.…”

The Secret of Efficiency? Social Relations and Patronage in the British Army in the Era of the First World War

“…26 Jim Beach and Stuart Mitchell have considered this interaction in their respective works, particularly where the extraction of best practice and lessons from the front line were concerned. 27 Aimée Fox has pushed that interplay further, exposing the relational connections between people and structures, arguing that the Army had a 'networked approach' to learning across its various operational theatres. This approach involved the Army blending different methods whether top-down, bottom-up, horizontal, or informal depending on the challenge or situation it faced.…”