2014 47th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture 2014
DOI: 10.1109/micro.2014.25
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Iso-X: A Flexible Architecture for Hardware-Managed Isolated Execution

Abstract: Abstract-We consider the problem of how to provide an execution environment where the application's secrets are safe even in the presence of malicious system software layers. We propose Iso-X -a flexible, fine-grained hardware-supported framework that provides isolation for security-critical pieces of an application such that they can execute securely even in the presence of untrusted system software. Isolation in Iso-X is achieved by creating and dynamically managing compartments to host critical fragments of… Show more

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Cited by 60 publications
(51 citation statements)
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References 32 publications
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“…CRAs, including both return-oriented [57] and jump-oriented [11] variations remain open vulnerabilities and active research topics, despite some promising solutions [48,70,36,37]. An orthogonal line of research pursues protection of application secrets even in the presence of compromised system software layers and malware [23,25,42].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…CRAs, including both return-oriented [57] and jump-oriented [11] variations remain open vulnerabilities and active research topics, despite some promising solutions [48,70,36,37]. An orthogonal line of research pursues protection of application secrets even in the presence of compromised system software layers and malware [23,25,42].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another approach is to employ some existing hardware-assisted isolated execution solutions such as Iso-X [27] or Bastion [33]. This approach has two advantages.…”
Section: Smc Allocationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, it is strongly prohibited due to the protection of the securely launched kernel module or the hardware assisted memory compartment setup (see Section 6.7.1). The detailed security analysis of these two approaches can be found in [25,27]. Alternatively, one can also modify the address value in set_sr instruction even though the SMC is securely set up.…”
Section: Security Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
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