Islam, national identity and politics in contemporary Kazakhstan

Abstract

This article argues that, unlike other Central Asian states, the official response in Kazakhstan to its Islamic revival is distinctively ambivalent and even contradictory. The Nazarbayev government has rhetorically embraced the Kazakh qoja-centred Sufi heritage and the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam as the 'traditional' forms of Islam among Kazakh nomads and perceived them as constituent elements of the nationbuilding process. However, the representatives of the political elite have in reality unknowingly absorbed much of 'untraditional' Salafi Islam and ignored, marginalised or even suppressed the revival of Kazakh Sufism. This is in part because of their limited knowledge of the indigenous Kazakh Islamic tradition and in part due to the younger generation's greater exposure to a range of Salafi-dominated influences emanating from abroad. The article begins with a brief historical perspective on the relationship between qoja-centred Sufism and 'Kazakh-ness' which is essential for establishing an analysis of the fissures in the current religious and political ideology pertaining to Kazakh nation-building.

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