ISIS, Wahhabism and Takfir

Abstract

Much has been written about the rise and expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) – hereinafter referred to interchangeably as ISIL and ISIS – since its emergence, and analyses are being published non-stop. The facile utilization of cultural interpretations to explain such phenomena, connecting the development of ISIL with Arab-Islamic culture, is common. There have been widespread attempts by some racist self-proclaimed Arab nationalists, based on ‘orientalist’ concepts, to connect it to ‘Bedouin culture’. All these analyses have neglected the existence of many other factors that contributed to the development of this group, the least significant of which was the cultural factor. Recognizing the difference between the causes of the emergence and existence of ISIS in Arab political arenas, and its practices – of which the latter can be explained by its ideological formation – is essential. This article focuses on two particular aspects that characterize ISIL: its success in annexing large geographical areas inside Iraq and Syria; and the colossal level of violence the group exercises against its enemies, and against unarmed, innocent people, far exceeding that of other armed groups in the region on many levels. It also addresses two key factors that help shed light on what instigated the emergence, expansion and even ability of this group to attract cadres and supporters from within and beyond the Arab countries.

Lineages of the Islamic State: An International Historical Sociology of State (De‐)Formation in Iraq

“…Ideologically, the Ba’athists’ pan‐Arabism resonated with salafi territorial universalism. Modern day salafi‐jihadi groups have retained the expansionist ethos of their original wahabi formation which the Saudi dynasty's state‐formation in Arabia had eventually arrested (Al‐Ibrahim, ). The contradiction of wahabi universalism and Saudi de‐facto nationalism has marked the state of Saudi Arabia since its inception.…”

“…However, both of these assumptions have been effectively challenged (Haddad, ; Jung, ; Matin, ; Matin, ; Matin, ; Phillips, ; Ruthven, ). Analytically, most existing accounts variously concentrate on IS's immediate origins in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war (Al‐Tamimi, ; Hashim, ), its salafi (fundamentalist) doctrine (Al‐Ibrahim, ), religious zeal (Wood, ), organisational structure (Acun, ; Hashim, ), military tactics (Katagiri, ), revenue sources (Kan, : 15; Tripp, ), hyper‐recruitment of foreign fighters (Al‐Ubaydi, ; Basit, ), or necessary measures for defeating the movement (Cordesman, ; McCants, ), or a combination of two or more of these aspects (Fromson and Simon, ).…”

“…Ideologically, the Ba'athists' pan-Arabism resonated with salafi territorial universalism. Modern day salafi-jihadi groups have retained the expansionist ethos of their original wahabi formation which the Saudi dynasty's state-formation in Arabia had eventually arrested(Al-Ibrahim, 2015).The contradiction of wahabi universalism and Saudi de-facto nationalism has marked the state of Saudi Arabia since its inception. For even though the Saudi tribe had managed to co-opt the clerical elites of their wahabi allies for the purpose of constructing a territorial state, the original idea of a universal Islamic state that marked wahabi movement remained alive and attractive.…”

The Construction of Collective Identity in Terrorist Discourse: A Case Study of ISIS' Rumiyah Magazine

“…Because of ISIS' fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, its members view themselves as the only true Muslims and all those who oppose them as unbelievers. Thus, ISIS' exclusionist ideology is used to justify the use of excessive violence and perpetrating atrocities against all Muslims and non-Muslims who do not pledge loyalty to it (Al-Ibrahim, 2015;Hashim, 2016).…”

Islam and the Islamic State's Magazine,Dabiq

“…Indeed, it is this politicization of Ibn abd al-Wahhab's otherwise unremarkable Hanbali / Athari scholarship on the dangers of taqlid (imitation) and the need to resist fabricated religious edicts with increased public engagement (to a point where it was used by the nascent Saudi state to attack the Persians at Karbala in 1801 and to lay claim to the Hejaz in 1804) which largely determines ad-Dawlah ’s selection of his work (al-Rasheed 2002, 22). Ignoring the awkward fact that neither he nor his followers advocated establishing a Caliphate in opposition to Ottoman suzerainty, Dabiq ’s authors prefer to concentrate largely on the same narrow medley of quotations (al-Ibrahim 2015, 412). Derived less from his writings and more from “the practices of the early Saudi wars of expansion, over which Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, during his life, had considerable influence”, the great majority of these focus on three intertwined themes: (1) the obligation to oppose tyranny (such as the Baghdad and Damascus governments of today), (2) the responsibility to emigrate if imperiled (to the new Caliphate), and (3) the need to impose social order (through the domestic policies of the nascent regime in Raqqah) (Macris 2016, 240).…”