Is vote-selling desirable?

Weiss, Jeffrey H.

doi:10.1007/bf00054453

Cited by 18 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…As previous work has shown, however, this is a nontrivial problem: most of the existing results in the literature are negative, demonstrating the nonexistence of vote buying or vote trading equilibria (e.g., Park, 1967;Kadane, 1972;Bernholtz, 1973Bernholtz, , 1974Ferejohn, 1974;Schwartz, 1977Schwartz, , 1981Shubik and Van der Heyden, 1978;Weiss, 1988).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 87%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market

Philipson

Snyder²

1996

Public Choice

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study an organized market for votes, in which trade is directed by a market "specialist". This market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome, and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is Pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade. We then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one-dimensional policy space, and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough, then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying (the median ideal point). This difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for sidepayments.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 87%

“…Thus, vote trading cannot produce equilibrium outcomes that improve upon the outcomes attainable under majority-rule without vote trading. In related work, Weiss (1988) argues that majority voting with vote buying will lead to Pareto suboptimal outcomes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market

Philipson

Snyder²

1996

Public Choice

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…A number of important contributions 2 helps us make this point. Weiss (1988) begins by showing the well-known result that no equilibrium exists for a majoritarian voting game with vote-selling: for positive prices anyone on the losing side will want to sell his or her vote, i.e. there is excess supply, and for zero prices there is excess demand.…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Clientelism and vote buying: lessons from field experiments in African elections

Vicente

Wantchékon

2009

Oxford Review of Economic Policy

162

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Electoral clientelism and vote buying are widely perceived as major obstacles to economic development. This is because they may limit the provision of public goods. In this paper, we review the literature on clientelism and vote buying and propose the use of field experiments to evaluate empirically the consequences of these phenomena. We provide an overview, discuss implementation, and interpret the main results of recent field experiments conducted by the authors in West African countries. Clientelism and vote buying seem to be effective and to enjoy widespread electoral support. The results suggest that increased access to information and political participation by women may limit clientelism. In addition, voter education campaigns may undermine the effects of vote buying on voting behaviour. We argue that our findings may inform the design of development aid interventions, as a way effectively to increase public-good political accountability. We also discuss directions for fruitful future research.

show abstract

“…These distinctive properties create a major theoretical obstacle to understanding vote trading. In the standard competitive model of exchange, equilibrium, as well as other standard concepts such as the core, typically fails to exist (Park 1967;Kadane 1972;Bernholtz 1973Bernholtz , 1974Ferejohn 1974;Schwartz 1977Schwartz , 1981Shubik and Van der Heyden 1978;Weiss 1988;Piketty 1994;Philipson and Snyder 1996). The following simple example illustrates both the potential inefficiency of majority rule and the problem of nonexistence of equilibrium.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes

Casella

Llorente-Saguer

Palfrey

2012

Journal of Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of ex ante vote-trading equilibrium and show by construction that an equilibrium exists. The equilibrium we characterize always results in dictatorship if there is any trade, and the market for votes generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough or the distribution of values is not very skewed. We test the theoretical implications in the laboratory using a continuous open-book multiunit double auction.

show abstract

Is vote-selling desirable?

Abstract: We first show that, in general, a majority-voting game with vote-selling will not have any equilibria. We then evaluate the desirability of vote-selling, using a rudimentary 'theory of blocking trajectories.'

Cited by 18 publications

References 16 publications

Equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market

Equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market

Clientelism and vote buying: lessons from field experiments in African elections

Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About