An important issue in vision research concerns the order of visual processing. S. P. Vecem and R. C. O'Reilly (1998) presented an interactive, hierarchical model that placed figure-ground segregation prior to object recognition. M. A. Peterson (1999) critiqued this model, arguing that because it used ambiguous stimulus displays, figme-ground processing did not precede object processing. In the current article, the authors respond to Peterson's (1999) interpretation of ambiguity in the model and her interpretation of what it means for figure-ground processing to come before object recognition. The authors argue that complete stimulus ambiguity is not critical to the model and that figure-ground precedes object recognition architecturally in the model. The arguments are supported with additional simulation results and an experiment, demonstrating that top-down inputs can influence figure-ground organization in displays that contain stimulus cues. According to many theories of visual perception, prior to object identification the visual system must solve the problem of determining which retinal locations belong together or bind with one another. Grouping locations within the retinal array allows the visual system to determine provisionally which locations are occupied by a single shape or object. To solve the problem of grouping or binding retinal locations from the same shape, the visual system relies on a number of organizational processes. These processes include the gestalt principles of organization (e.g., Wertheimer, 1923/1958) and figure-ground organization (e.g., Rubin, 1915/1958). However, not all theories of visual perception accept that organization precedes recognition. Specifically, Peterson (see Peterson, 1994, for a summary) proposed that the relationship between organization and recognition should be reversed from the traditional accounts to allow some recognition processes to occur prior to perceptual organization. The focus of our current exchange with Peterson (1999) is on figure-ground processes and how these processes relate to object-identification processes. Despite Peterson's (1999) criticisms of our interactive model (Vecera & O'Reilly, 1998; also see Vecera & Farah, 1997), we still contend that the interactive model provides the best computationally ex