Is There Collective Scientific Knowledge? Arguments From Explanation

Abstract

If there is collective scientific knowledge, then at least some scientific groups have beliefs over and above the personal beliefs of their members. Gilbert's plural-subjects theory makes precise the notion of 'over and above' here. Some philosophers have used plural-subjects theory to argue that philosophical, historical and sociological studies of science should take account of collective beliefs of scientific groups. Their claims rest on the premise that our best explanations of scientific change include these collective beliefs. I argue that Gilbert's account of collective scientific belief does not provide a better explanation of scientific change than a non-collective alternative. A different defence of collective scientific belief and knowledge is needed.

Empirical Philosophy of Science

“…In doing so, I have been able to explicate the interactive epistemic practices that underlie the creation of 'collective' knowledge. So far, the question whether and to what extent collaboratively created knowledge is to be described as genuinely 'collective' knowledge has almost exclusively been dealt with on purely conceptual grounds, by discussing hypothetical, supposedly 'typical' or generic examples and/or by drawing on common sense knowledge (Gilbert 2000;Wray 2002;Fagan 2011). The discussion of 'collective' knowledge has, however, not been systematically informed by the perspective of practicing scientists, a notable exception being the work of Staley (2007) and Rehg and Staley (2008) who rest their reflection on an interview study.…”

Collective Scientific Knowledge

“…For group G to summatively believe that p, it is necessary and sufficient that all or most of G’s members believe that p. Summative group belief is reducible to the beliefs of individual members, in the sense that the latter provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the former. This is a classic sense of reduction, though not the only one that bears on questions of scientific knowledge (Fagan 2011, forthcoming). Scientific consensus is often interpreted as summative.…”

“…So relational group beliefs are not simple things, but systems of members’ beliefs and social epistemic relations among them (Niiniluoto 2003, 271–273). Tuomela’s ‘positional group belief’ (1995), Corlett’s ‘sophisticated summative belief’ (1996), Ernst & Chant’s ‘equilibrium view’ (2007) and Fagan’s ‘interactive belief’ (2011) are all refinements of this basic relational view. Despite being framed in terms of groups having irreducibly collective knowledge, Wray’s (2007) account of epistemic interdependence among members of scientific groups also falls into this category 18 .…”

A Role for Judgment Aggregation in Coauthoring Scientific Papers

“…The non-summative group belief, a certain interpretation of the poem, is established through a deliberation and dialoguing process. Fagan (2011) argues for a middle way position where the group belief is established through the interaction between individual members' beliefs; she calls this third option interactive belief. But these processes of collective belief formation do not necessarily describe the construction of a written document.…”