Is There a Right to Polygamy? Marriage, Equality and Subsidizing Families in Liberal Public Justification

Abstract

Th is paper argues that the four most plausible arguments compatible with public reason for an outright legal ban on all forms of polygamy are unvictorious. I consider the types of arguments political liberals would have to insist on, and precisely how strongly, in order for a general prohibition against polygamy to be justifi ed, while also considering what general attitude towards "marriage" and legal recognition of the right to marry are most consistent with political liberalism. I argue that a liberal state should get out of the "marriage business" by leveling down to a universal status of "civil union" neutral as to the gender and aff ective purpose of domestic partnerships. I then refute what I regard as the four most plausible rational objections to off ering this civil union status to multi-member domestic partnerships. Th e most common objection to polygamy is on grounds of gender equality, more specifi cally, female equality. But advancing this argument forcefully often involves neglecting the tendency of political liberalism (by whatever name it goes in contemporary, complex, multicultural societies) to tolerate a certain amount of inequality in private, within the bounds of robust and meaningful freedoms of choice and exit. Properly understood, polygamy involves no inherent statement about the essential inferiority of women, and certainly not more than many other existing practices and institutions (including many expressions of the main monotheistic religions) which political liberals regard as tolerable, even reasonable. Arguments from the welfare of children, fairness in the spousal market, and the abuse of family subsidies are also considered and found insuffi cient for excluding polygamy.

Confucianism and Same-Sex Marriage

“…But as I argued, the concern with fairness is addressed to some extent when we insist on the consent of the parties involved. As March pointed out, factually, “the vast majority of polygynous families are not as tyrannical or oppressive as some of the extreme cases known to the wider public”; and philosophically, as I already indicated in my explanation of the hidden liberal concern with polygyny, to reject polygyny on the basis of female autonomy would eventually “rest on either philosophically controversial conceptions of free will, or morally controversial conceptions” of a rather high level of autonomy (March 2011, 258–59).…”

“…There is a lot of discussion of this issue, and let me just mention two articles. In these articles, March argued “on public policy grounds” (2011, 248), and Den Otter argued on the ground of “state interest” (2015, 1984), that there is no distinction between same-sex marriage and plural marriage. Den Otter's article is more from a constitutional law perspective than March's, but March's article is far more organized and clear.…”

Rethinking Religious Reasons in Public Justification

“…Suppose the religious move, even using scripturalist forms of religious argument, is not to deny civic and moral goods to homosexual fellow citizens, but to get the state out of the marriage business entirely, to save the symbolic and sacred associations by removing “marriage” from state power. This is not only politically reasonable, but something that many liberal, feminist, and queer theorists might equally endorse because of their own reservations about “marriage” as a symbolic institution with which they, or the state, can identify (Butler 2002; Chambers 2013; Cott 2000; March 2010, 2011; Metz 2010; Polikoff 2008; Sunstein and Thaler 2008; Warner 1999).…”

“…This is not only politically reasonable, but something that many liberal, feminist, and queer theorists might equally endorse because of their own reservations about "marriage" as a symbolic institution with which they, or the state, can identify (Butler 2002;Chambers 2013;Cott 2000;March 2010March , 2011Metz 2010;Polikoff 2008;Sunstein and Thaler 2008;Warner 1999). Suppose the religious response to the push for same-sex marriage is to propose "leveling down" to a universal civil union status for all citizens, reserving "marriage"-like baptism-for the realm of religious associations.…”

Justificatory Liberalism and Same‐Sex Marriage

“…Second, I am not going to address the question of whether marriage, as a legally recognized institution, should be entirely abolished and replaced with some version of civil unions or other kinds of legally sanctioned relationships. Some thinkers in the liberal tradition have made suggestions of this sort as a possible resolution to the SSM debate (March ). They are surely worthy of serious consideration, and may very well resolve most or all of the problems I draw attention to in this article.…”