Is There a Problem about Nonconceptual Content?

Speaks, Jeff

doi:10.1215/00318108-114-3-359

Cited by 116 publications

(76 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The step from experience to belief might then be described as one of "conceptualization". The distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content is notoriously difficult to pin down (for discussion, see Heck 2000;2007, Speaks 2005), but it is hard to see how it might help here.…”

Section: The Defeasibility Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification

Glüer

2015

Philos Stud

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Section: The Defeasibility Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification

Glüer

2015

Philos Stud

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“…Crowther 2006;Heck 2000;Laurier 2004;Speaks 2005;Tye 2006). On the first-which following Heck's terminology, I'll call the content view-when we claim that the content of perceptual experiences is nonconceptual, we say something about the kind of content that perceptual experiences, as opposed to e.g.…”

Section: Two Versions Of Perceptual Nonconceptualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It has been used in an attempt to show that most arguments in favour of perceptual nonconceptualism succeed only in establishing the truth of SNC, but leave CNC unsupported (Speaks 2005;Crowther 2006). Take, for instance, the so-called fineness of grain argument, based on the idea that our perceptual experiences outstrip our perceptual concepts (see e.g.…”

Section: Two Versions Of Perceptual Nonconceptualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Typically the T1 theorist (e.g. Byrne 2005;Crowther 2006;Speaks 2005, Stalnaker 1998) portrays such a notion in terms of functions from possible worlds to truth-values or Russellian propositions. Yet, sets of possible worlds are seriously flawed as a way of capturing not only the fine-grained content of perception, but also the fine-grained content of belief.…”

Section: The Logical Independence Of Snc and Cnc: Content And Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism

Toribio

2008

Erkenn

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It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations. On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems consistent to hold that both perceptual experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, but that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience, the subject need not possess the concepts involved in a correct characterization of such content. I argue that the consistency of this position requires a non-Fregean notion of content that fails to capture the way the subject grasps the world as being. Hence state nonconceptualism leaves perceptual content attribution unsupported. Yet, on a characterization of content along the relevant (neo-Fregean) lines, this position would become incoherent, as it would entail that a subject could exercise cognitive abilities she doesn't possess. I conclude that, given the notion of content demanded by the debate, the state view does entail the content view after all.

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“…For example, it might be that experiences typically involve a relation to pairs of objects and properties, whereas beliefs always only involve a relation to sets of possible worlds (see Byrne 2005a andSpeaks 2005).…”

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confidence: 99%

The significance of high-level content

Silins

2012

Philos Stud

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Is There a Problem about Nonconceptual Content?

Cited by 116 publications

References 15 publications

Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification

Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification

State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism

The significance of high-level content

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