2008
DOI: 10.22495/cocv6i1p12
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Is there a firm-size effect in CEO stock option grants?

Abstract: Schaefer (1998) and Baker and Hall (2004) posit a firm size effect for regular executive compensation but not specifically for executive stock option grants. They propose an inverse relation between pay-performance sensitivity and firm size along with a positive relation between the marginal productivity of executive effort and firm size. The product of pay-performance sensitivity and executive productivity is „incentive strength‟. They find a weakly positive association between incentive strength and firm siz… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…They used book value of total assets as a proxy for firm size. Rosser et al ( [23], pp. 115-126) also used book value of total assets as firm size when they investigated the impact of firm size on CEO compensation.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…They used book value of total assets as a proxy for firm size. Rosser et al ( [23], pp. 115-126) also used book value of total assets as firm size when they investigated the impact of firm size on CEO compensation.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is an ongoing debate at present how corporate governance should be define (Jarzemowska [13], pp. [22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34]. The concept of corporate governance can be looked at form legal and economic perspective.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%