Is the WTO Passé?

Bagwell, Kyle; Bown, Chad P.; Staiger, Robert W.

doi:10.1257/jel.20151192

Cited by 102 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 288 publications

(341 reference statements)

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“…More importantly, they show that the scale of trade affected by resort to contingent protectionism was small. 4 Second, in their survey of the World Trade Organization, Bagwell, Bown, and Staiger (2016) credit enhanced multilateral monitoring of government trade policy choice with limiting resort to protectionism since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis. For political scientists, such as Drezner (2014), ''the system worked,'' that is the existing regime of international trade agreements prevented a major outbreak of protectionism in 2009-2010.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Protectionism, state discrimination, and international business since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis

Evenett

2019

J Int Bus Policy

159

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The manner and extent of state discrimination against international business since the start of the Global Financial Crisis is documented and interpreted. Without resorting to 1930s-style across-the-board tariff increases, governments have tilted the playing field in favor of local firms so often since November 2008 that 70% of the world's goods exports competed against crisis-era trade distortions by 2013. Export mercantilism and other forms of selective subsidization are persistent features of crisis-era policy response. Available

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Protectionism, state discrimination, and international business since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis

Evenett

2019

J Int Bus Policy

159

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“…In this second best scenario, policy makers implement the 'constrained'optimal allocation of a planner who cannot a¤ect the relation between quantity and cuto¤ dictated by (6). This planner thus maximizes welfare (16), subject not only to the resource constraint (17) but also to the product mix constraint (6), with respect to the choice variables q 0l , N E;l and c lh (instead of q lh (c)) for l; h = 1; :::; M .…”

Section: Second and Third Best Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 As it exhibits linear demand, it satis…es MSLD and thus features pro-competitive e¤ects, pricing to market, dumping, and incomplete pass-through as well as higher markups for better performing …rms. 6 As it is analytically solvable with asymmetries in market size, technology and accessibility for an arbitrary number of countries, it allows for transparent comparative statics in a multi-country setup. As the marginal utility of income is constant and utility is transferable, it allows for a consistent e¢ ciency analysis based on a straightforward de…nition of global welfare for an economy with heterogeneous countries as the sum of all individuals'indirect utilities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Models with no 'outside good'generate, instead, a perfectly inelastic labor supply curve and hence isolate the e¤ects of trade policy on the terms of trade. 6 As linear demand also satis…es MSLD', it also features lower pass-through rate for better performing …rms (Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano, 2016). 7 The assumption of quasi-linear utility, under which income transfers are utility transfers, is also frequently made in political economy models of trade policy (Grossman and Helpman, 2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Geography, Competition, and Optimal Multilateral Trade Policy

2019

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How should multilateral trade policy be designed in a world in which countries differ in terms of market access and technology, and firms with market power differ in terms of productivity? We answer this question in a model of monopolistic competition in which variable markups increasing in firm size are a key source of misallocation across firms and countries. We use `disadvantaged' to refer to countries with smaller market size, worse state of technology (in terms of higher innovation and production costs), and worse geography (in terms of more remoteness from other countries). We show that, in a global welfare perspective, optimal multilateral trade policy should: promote the sales of low cost firms to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones; trim the sales of high cost firms to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones; reduce firm entry in all countries, but especially in disadvantaged ones. This would not only restore efficiency but also reduce welfare inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries if their differences in market size, state of technology and geography are large enough.

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“… A more complete articulation of these concerns can be found in Bagwell et al. (). See also Bagwell and Staiger (), which suggests that current WTO rules limiting subsidies may be excessively stringent. …”

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confidence: 99%

Mega‐Regional Trade Agreements and the Future of the WTO

Bown

2017

Global Policy

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Major economies such as the United States, European Union, Japan, and even China have shifted trade negotiating emphasis toward 'mega-regional' agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). This paper explores why countries have chosen to pursue mega-regionals, what is likely to be contained in the agreements, and some of their potential implications for the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO). I call for revisiting the historical approach of introducing plurilateral and critical mass agreements -that would cover some of the mega-regionals' new provisions -into the WTO so as to avoid a more substantial, long-run erosion of the relevance of the nondiscriminatory system. I also highlight potential reforms to the WTO's dispute settlement procedure that are required to strengthen its already prominent role.The major economies have shifted trade negotiating emphasis toward mega-regional agreements. The emergence of three sets of negotiations -the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement among Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, the United States, and seven other countries; the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the United States and the European Union (EU); and China's pursuit of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations -raises a host of short and long-term questions for the multilateral trading system and the World Trade Organization (WTO).The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO established a multilateral system for trade that has remained largely unchanged since 1995. The desire to write new rules to address potential nontariff barriers to tradecovering public health and product safety standards, labor and the environment, international investment, digital trade and e-commerce, and state-owned enterprises -is an important driver of both the TPP and TTIP negotiations. 1 These new regional trade agreements (RTAs) pose some potential threats to the multilateral system. First, they are discriminatory agreements that provide preferences to insiders at the expense of outsiders, and this could lead to economic distortions or a fracturing of global trade into competing blocks. Second, many of these issue areas are being brought into a trade agreement for the first time. The full consequences of this policy decision -including for the WTO -are still largely unknown.However, direct steps can be taken to help mitigate such concerns. One is to return to plurilateral and critical mass agreements to bring some of the mega-regionals' important new disciplines into the WTO. However, reforms to the WTO's dispute settlement procedures are also needed to further strengthen and sustain its most prominent, dayto-day function. The multilateral trading systemThe GATT was established in 1947, and it shepherded the multilateral trading system until it was replaced by the WTO in 1995. O...

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Is the WTO Passé?

Cited by 102 publications

References 288 publications

Protectionism, state discrimination, and international business since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis

Protectionism, state discrimination, and international business since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis

Geography, Competition, and Optimal Multilateral Trade Policy

Mega‐Regional Trade Agreements and the Future of the WTO

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