Is the problem of evil a deontological problem?

Mooney, Justin

doi:10.1093/analys/anx039

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Tooley (2019) and (2021), and Plantinga and Tooley (2008)) focuses on rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, and claims that the recognized wrongmaking properties of some evil E make it likely that E is all things considered impermissible. And Mooney (2017, forthcoming) has explored deontological formulations of the argument from evil that make use of side-constraints – non-axiological and non-consequentialist constraints on God's actions 7…”

Section: Deontological Sceptical Theismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deontological sceptical theism proved

Hendricks

2023

Rel. Stud.

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In this article, I argue that sceptical theists have too narrow a focus: they consider only God's axiological reasons, ignoring any non-axiological reasons he may have. But this is a mistake: predicting how God will act requires knowing about his reasons in general, and this requires knowing about both God's axiological and non-axiological reasons. In light of this, I construct and defend a kind of sceptical theism – Deontological Sceptical Theism – that encompasses all of God's reasons, and briefly illustrate how it renders irrelevant certain charges of excessive sceptical and how it evaporates equiprobability objections. Furthermore, I put forth a simple argument in favour of Deontological Sceptical Theism, which shows that everyone (at least currently) ought to endorse it.

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Section: Deontological Sceptical Theismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deontological sceptical theism proved

Hendricks

2023

Rel. Stud.

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“…8 Some complain that consequentialist considerations could never justify particularly horrendous evils (cf., e.g., Dougherty, 2008;Gellman, 2017;Mooney, 2017). In Sects.…”

Section: Necessary Evilmentioning

confidence: 99%

God and gratuitous evil: Between the rock and the hard place

Oliveira

2023

Int J Philos Relig

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To most of us -believers and non-believers alike -the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn't hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God's existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I'm right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see.

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“…Side constraints also go by the names "agent-relative restrictions" and "agent-centered restrictions. "2 IncludingGellman (1992), McNaughton (1995& 2002,Dougherty (2008),Mooney (2017), and Sterba (2019a& 2019b.…”

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confidence: 99%