Is The Law a Mere Parchment Barrier to Human Rights Abuse?

Keith, Linda Camp; Tate, C. Neal; Poe, Steven C.

doi:10.1017/s0022381609090513

Cited by 120 publications

(105 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…24. A large body of literature highlights the link between domestic judicial independence and increased respect for human rights (Blasi and Cingranelli 1996;Cross 1999;Keith 2002a;Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009;Powell and Staton 2009). 25.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Divergent Incentives for Dictators

Conrad

2012

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Although they are arguably the worst violators of human rights, dictators sometimes commit to international human rights treaties like the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) to appease their domestic opposition. Importantly, however, executives facing effective judiciaries must anticipate ex post costs that can arise when international treaties are likely to be enforced domestically. This suggests that one domestic institution-a political opposition party-may provide a dictator with incentives to commit to international human rights treaties and violate human rights, while another-an effective domestic judiciary-may constrain the dictator's ability to violate human rights and incentivize him to avoid international commitment. How do dictators make choices about commitment to human rights law and respect for human rights when they face conflicting domestic incentives? Furthermore, how do these divergent incentives affect compliance when dictators do commit to international treaties? In this article, I argue that the domestic incentives dictators face to support the CAT and engage in torture are moderated in countries with effective domestic judiciaries.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Divergent Incentives for Dictators

Conrad

2012

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…Keith finds that constitutional provisions for judicial independence are significantly related to better performance on basic rights (Keith 2002b). Keith et al (2009) report mixed findings with regard to a set of measures of constitutional judicial independence, with two measures significantly associated with better respect for rights and the others falling short of statistical significance. Six of the nonstatistically significant measures had the wrong sign (they were associated with worse human rights performance) (Keith et al 2009).…”

Section: Courtsmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…The majority of formal rights she evaluates do not correlate with better rights performance, and some constitutional rights are associated with higher levels of abuses, including torture (Keith 2002a). In a later article, Keith and her coauthors report similarly "disappointing" results, though some constitutional provisions are associated with better rights protection (Keith et al 2009). In fact, countries that regularly abuse human rights often boast the most elaborate lists of constitutional rights, including the more "esoteric" ones (Law and Versteeg forthcoming).…”

Section: Constitutionsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Treaties, Constitutions, Courts, and Human Rights

Sandholtz¹

2012

Journal of Human Rights

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The effects of treaties on human rights performance may depend in part on how domestic legal systems articulate with international law. The idea motivating this study is that constitutional law can make a difference not necessarily by including rights but by acknowledging and connecting to treaty law. This study is a first attempt to explore the interrelated effects of treaties, constitutions, and courts on human rights performance.The key proposition is that human rights treaties may have a greater influence on rights in countries whose constitutions incorporate treaty law and whose courts are independent of the political branches of government. The analysis tests that proposition using data from about 150 countries across 20 or more years. The results offer evidence that treaties, constitutions, and courts do combine, at times, to improve human rights performance, with judicial independence playing the key role.With the proliferation of human rights treaties after World War II, activists, scholars, and citizens have held the hope that international law could help to protect human rights and reduce abuses. Treaties to protect rights could empower victims and their advocates provide tools to nongovernmental organizations, strengthen elements of the state that oppose abuses and influence legislative agendas. The hope has been that international human rights law could improve human rights, at least on the margin and perhaps more fundamentally over the long term.Research on the effects of treaties on human rights performance has not been encouraging. Early studies reached pessimistic conclusions, with more recent research finding limited positive effects of treaty participation on human rights performance in some contexts. Scholarship on the effects of constitutional provisions on human rights practices has been perhaps even less encouraging. Rights provisions are a virtually universal feature of modern constitutions, even in countries where governments routinely violate human rights.This article begins with the idea that the effects of treaties on human rights performance may depend in part on how domestic legal systems articulate with international law. Legal protections for human rights may be mutually reinforcing, so that human rights law is more effective when it links across legal levels-national and international-and with domestic legal institutions. The intuition is that constitutional law can make a difference not necessarily by including rights-almost all constitutions do-but by acknowledging Wayne Sandholtz is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. Much of his research has focused on the development, diffusion, and effects of international norms. His most recent books (Prohibiting Plunder and International Norms and Cycles of Change) offer a framework for explaining how and why norms change and apply it to a variety of substantive domains. His current research focuses on the role of national high courts in the transnational migration of legal ideas and principles.

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“…Aristotle compares the lawgiver to a craftsman who turns natural material (the exigencies of nature and natural human impulses) into a finished product (a legal order). Such persons are totally trustworthy and incorruptible; they do not require safeguards against the abuse of power (Swiffen, 2011;Keith, Tate, & Poe, 2009). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%