Is the Constitutional Court the last bastion in Russia against the threat of authoritarianism?

Baudoin, Marie-Elisabeth

doi:10.1080/09668130600731185

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Somewhat similar to Turkey, the court used its clout to selectively protect some groups while suppressing the demands of others (Belge 2006). Nor did the court function as the "last bastion against the threat of authoritarianism" (Baudoin 2006). Quite to the contrary, it became a crucial pillar of a stable authoritarian regime (Hendley 2015;Solomon 2015;Popova 2017), and the "fifth wheel of the carriage of the Russian autocracy" (Schwartz 2000, 162).…”

Section: [Page 485]mentioning

confidence: 99%

The institutionalization of relative advantage: formal institutions, subconstitutional presidential powers, and the rise of authoritarian politics in Russia, 1994–2012

Burkhardt

2017

Post-Soviet Affairs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What role do formal institutions play in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes such as the Russian Federation? Oftentimes, it is assumed that autocrats, usually potent presidents, wield informal powers and control far flung patron-client networks that undermine formal institutions and bolster their rule. After the institutional turn in authoritarianism studies, elections, parties, legislatures, or courts have taken center stage, yet presidencies and public law are still on the margins of this research paradigm. This paper proposes a method for measuring subconstitutional presidential power and its change by federal law, decrees, and Constitutional Court rulings as well as a theoretical framework for explaining when and under which conditions subconstitutional presidential power expands. It is argued that as a result of a gradual, small-scale, and slow-moving process of layering, presidential powers have been accumulated over time. This furthers the institutionalization of presidential advantage toward other federal and regional institutions, which in turn contributes to the consolidation of authoritarianism.

show abstract

Section: [Page 485]mentioning

confidence: 99%

The institutionalization of relative advantage: formal institutions, subconstitutional presidential powers, and the rise of authoritarian politics in Russia, 1994–2012

Burkhardt

2017

Post-Soviet Affairs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…None of this, of course, implies that the judicial reforms pioneered in transitional Russia were an unequivocal success, or that they resulted in a comprehensive rights culture. It is well documented both that the transitional Russian state, especially under Yeltsin, eventually entered a condition of near collapse and endemic reprivatisation (see, for example, Garcelon, 2005, p. 7), and that the first experiment with rights-based judicial review was ultimately superseded by a more authoritarian model of judicial control under Putin (Thorson, 2004, p. 189; Baudoin, 2006, p. 697; Solomon, 2002, p. 123) 46 . Despite this, however, the internal projection of constituent power by judicial actors authorised by rights norms was a precondition for the original revolutionary capacity of the political system of the Soviet Union to separate itself from its dense interpenetration with private office holders and party nomenklatura and to construct itself as an autonomous body of institutions.…”

Section: The Judicial Constitution Of Europe: a Functionalist Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

The formation of a European constitution: an approach from historical-political sociology

Thornhill

2012

International Journal of Law in Context

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article sets out a sociological reconstruction of the constitution of the European Union (EU). Utilising a methodology derived from historical-functionalist sociology, it explains the distinctive court-led, judicial form of this constitution within a wide comparative-sociological framework, and it cites earlier examples of judicialised constitutions to elucidate the adaptive functions performed by judicial actors in the EU constitution. The article proposes a new method for analysing constitutions in general and that of the EU in particular, and it offers an encompassing sociological perspective for addressing the increasing preponderance of judicial institutions in contemporary democratic polity building.

show abstract

“…For instance, Jane Henderson analyzed the unique case of the constitutionality of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union compared with the Russian Communist Party in 1992 (Henderson 2007). Marie-Elisabeth Baudoin found the factual approach of European judicial practice as a test of proportionality and "reserves of interpretation" in Russian constitutional convention (Baudoin 2006). James Richardson and Marat Shterin observed the constitutional courts' cases under religious freedom and freedom of association for religious organizations in a comparison of Russia and Hungary (Richardson, Shterin 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideology in Modern Russian Constitutional Practice

Rudt

2019

FOI

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The article focuses on Russian constitutional ideology with overview of its historical preconditions and analysis of recent significant cases of the Russian Constitutional Court. There is a discussion of gay activist Alekseyev’s case and “foreign agents’ law” case in constitutional practice as most significant examples of positivistic way of legal reasoning. The paper argues that legal positivism through its form – legal formalism is the main ideology in the modern constitutional practice in Russia. This ideology is based on the assumption that constitutional justice can find social truth. German positivistic and Soviet Marxist views have strongly determined the modern Russian constitutional discourse.

show abstract

Is the Constitutional Court the last bastion in Russia against the threat of authoritarianism?

Cited by 7 publications

References 4 publications

The institutionalization of relative advantage: formal institutions, subconstitutional presidential powers, and the rise of authoritarian politics in Russia, 1994–2012

The institutionalization of relative advantage: formal institutions, subconstitutional presidential powers, and the rise of authoritarian politics in Russia, 1994–2012

The formation of a European constitution: an approach from historical-political sociology

Ideology in Modern Russian Constitutional Practice

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About