Is the biological adaptiveness of delusions doomed?

Abstract

Delusions are usually considered as harmful and dysfunctional beliefs, one of the primary symptoms of a psychiatric illness and the mark of madness in popular culture. However, in recent times a much more positive role has been advocated for delusions. More specifically, it has been argued that delusions might be an (imperfect) answer to a problem rather than problems in themselves. By delivering psychological and epistemic benefits, delusions would allow people who face severe biological or psychological difficulties to survive in their environment - although this has obvious epistemic costs, as the delusion is fixed and irresponsive to compelling counterevidence. In other words, it has been argued that delusions are biologically adaptive. The adaptiveness of delusions has been compared by Ryan McKay and Daniel Dennett to a shear pin, a mechanism installed in the drive engine of some machines which is designed to shear whenever the machine is about to break down. By breaking, shear pins prevent the machine from collapsing and allow it to keep functioning, although in an impaired manner. Similarly, when delusions form, they would allow a cognitive or psychological system which is about to collapse to continue its functioning, although in an impaired manner. However, this optimistic picture of delusions risks being undermined by both theoretical and empirical considerations. Using Sarah Fineberg and Philip Corlett’s recent predictive coding account as a paradigmatic model of the biological adaptiveness of delusions, I develop two objections to it: (1) principles of parsimony and simplicity suggest that maladaptive models of delusions have an upper hand over adaptive models; and (2) the available empirical evidence suggests that at least some delusions stand good chances of being psychologically adaptive, but it is unlikely that they also qualify as biologically adaptive.

El delirio en la esquizofrenia como objeto de estudio interdisciplinario en la filosofía de la mente

“…La primera alternativa al problema sugiere que los delirios podrían jugar un rol beneficioso en la vida mental de los pacientes por la forma en que logran atenuar el sufrimiento psicológico. A este tipo de adaptabilidad se le denomina adaptabilidad psicológica (Mckay et al, 2005;Lancellotta, 2021). En la historia de la psiquiatría, la tradición psicoanalítica es una de las primeras que indica que los delirios son producidos por el beneficio psicológico que estos confieren a la vida mental de los pacientes.…”

Charting New Phenomenological Paths for Empirical Research on Delusions

“…The resulting symptom (ie, the delusion) is commonly taken to be both dysfunctional and harmful: delusions not only signify a breakdown in the mind or brain-impairing its evolutionary function-but also compromise psychological well-being and hence are both biologically and psychologically maladaptive. 4 In contrast (but not incompatible with the dysfunction view), the madness-as-strategy paradigm-more common in the phenomenological and psychoanalytic traditions-sees at least some mental symptoms as having a purpose or function for the individual. Delusions, in this view, may be partly adaptive if they deliver a psychological or evolutionary advantage.…”

“…Delusions, in this view, may be partly adaptive if they deliver a psychological or evolutionary advantage. 4 While the problem of biological adaptiveness is far from settled, the evidence for some kind of psychological adaptiveness is increasing. As is the case with other common forms of irrational beliefs (eg, confabulation, self-deception), delusions may deliver psychological and epistemic benefits-for instance through self-enhancement and reduction of negative feelings.…”

“…In line with neuropsychological models, the search for this putative dysfunction has mainly focused on biases or abnormalities in reasoning. The resulting symptom (ie, the delusion) is commonly taken to be both dysfunctional and harmful: delusions not only signify a breakdown in the mind or brain—impairing its evolutionary function—but also compromise psychological well-being and hence are both biologically and psychologically maladaptive …”

“…In contrast (but not incompatible with the dysfunction view), the madness-as-strategy paradigm—more common in the phenomenological and psychoanalytic traditions—sees at least some mental symptoms as having a purpose or function for the individual. Delusions, in this view, may be partly adaptive if they deliver a psychological or evolutionary advantage . While the problem of biological adaptiveness is far from settled, the evidence for some kind of psychological adaptiveness is increasing.…”