Is the All-Subjected Principle Extensionally Adequate?

Abstract

This paper critiques the All-Subjected Principle. The All-Subjected Principle is one of the most prominent answers to the Boundary Problem, which consists in determining who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision. The All-Subjected Principle comes in many versions, but the general idea is that all people who are subjected in a relevant sense with regard to a democratic decision should be entitled to participate in that decision. One respect in which versions of the All-Subjected Principle differ concerns how to best understand ‘subjectedness’. One view spells out ‘subjectedness’ in terms of legal bindingness. Another view understands ‘subjectedness’ in terms of coercion. I argue that the All-Subjected Principle is extensionally inadequate on both views in that it yields verdicts that are at odds with our considered judgements about certain cases. These cases involve legal norms of referral or international administrative assistance.

Enfranchising all subjected: A reconstruction and problematization

“…Abizadeh (2010: 121) defends the principle that "those subject to the state's laws have a right of democratic participation because such laws subject them to coercion" (but note that that connects subjectedness and coercion without equating them). The All Subjected Principle is further fleshed out by : Abizadeh, 2008: 58-60;Song, 2012: 51;Andric, 2021. Fraser (2008 would extend it to anyone "subject to the coercive power of non-state and trans-state forms of governmentality"; see similarly Fung (2013).…”

“… 4. For an early statement see Dahl (1979: 116; cf. Dahl, 1989: 122): “Every person subject to a government and its laws has an unqualified right to be a member of the demos.” See similarly: Dworkin, 1996: 155; López-Guerra, 2005; Miller, 2009: 222; Abizadeh, 2012, 2022; Andric, 2021: 389; Yaffe, 2020: 357–363.…”

“… 9. See, e.g. : Dahl, 1979: 112–113; López-Guerra, 2005: 219; Goodin, 2007: 49; 2024; Miller, 2009: 214; Andric, 2021: 390. Note, however, that (unless unanimity is the decision rule) any given individual may find himself bound by rules given to him by a majority of which he was not part.…”

We, The People, Silent and Powerless: A Critique of Recent Pluralist Conceptualizations of the People

“…These are questions that remain unutterablean outright taboo to scholarship on contemporary popular sovereignty. This is exemplified by the debate between the all-subjected and all-affected principles that have focused on who has the right to participate in politics without asking if they are even willing to or capable of participating (Andrić 2021;Lagerspetz 2015;Näsström 2011).…”

“…One is the debate between the all-subjected and all-affected principles. This focuses on who should have the right to participate in decision-making, thus, presupposing the existence of the People as a concrete and collective actor (Andrić 2021;Lagerspetz 2015;Näsström 2011). I will not focus on the aforementioned issue of legitimacy and boundaries.…”