Is Screening Cargo Containers for Smuggled Nuclear Threats Worthwhile?

Abstract

In recent years, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has installed radiation sensors to screen cargo containers entering the United States. They are concerned that terrorists could use containers to smuggle radiological material into the country and carry out attacks with dirty bombs or a nuclear device. Recent studies have questioned the value of improving this screening system with new sensor technology. The cost of delays caused by frequent false alarms outweighs any reduction in the probability of an attack in an expected cost analysis. We extend existing methodology in three ways to demonstrate how additional factors affect the value of screening investments. We examine the effect that screening has in discouraging terrorists. We model multiple levels of screening.Finally, we consider additional objectives beyond cost. We find that the conclusion about screening depends on key inputs to the probability model (reflecting uncertainties) and to the value function (reflecting the stakeholders' fundamental objectives).

From the Editors—Deterrence, Multiattribute Utility, and Probability and Bayes' Updating

“…But, if the defender does not impose high retaliation costs, 100% inspection is likely to be needed to deter nuclear smuggling attempts. This article extends the findings on cargo screening from Merrick and McLay (2010). Bakir (2008) also considered cargo screening decisions.…”

From the Editors—Probability Scoring Rules, Ambiguity, Multiattribute Terrorist Utility, and Sensitivity Analysis

“…A related prior paper in Decision Analysis by Dr. Bier is Haphuriwat et al (2011) on deterring the smuggling of nuclear weapons in container freight, which extends the findings on cargo screening from Merrick and McLay (2010) and is related to Bakır (2008) on cargo screening. In addition to her contributions as an author, Dr. Bier also serves as an associate editor; see Keller et al (2010).…”

From the Editors: Probability Approximations, Anti-Terrorism Strategy, and Bull's-Eye Display for Performance Feedback

“…Using game theory, Haphuriwat et al (2011) modeled terrorist decision making to examine nuclear detection technologies, extending prior cargo screening work by Merrick and McLay (2010), and Samuel and Guikema (2012) (2011) on a strategy to deter a country from nuclear weapon acquisition, Feng and Keller (2006) on potassium iodide distribution after a nuclear incident, and Hausken and Zhuang (2011) on governments' and terrorists' choices between attacking the enemy and defending against an attack. Additional prior game theory papers in Decision Analysis include van Binsbergen and Marx (2007), Cobb andBasuchoudhary (2009), Lippman andMcCardle (2004), and Rothkopf (2007).…”