Is Reliabilism a Form of Consequentialism?

Dunn, Jeffrey; Ahlström-Vij, Kristoffer

doi:10.2307/44982135

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…I argue that Berker fails to demonstrate that they are consequentialists because either there is no evidence that they do accept Instrumental-Value and Truth-Conduciveness, or they do reject them. I also discuss the defense of process reliabilism by Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn (2014;Dunn and Ahlstrom-Vij 2017) and argue that their defense in fact supports that reliabilism is instrumentalist. Alston (2005) urges us to dispense the monistic conception of epistemic justification with the pluralist conception of epistemic desiderata.…”

Section: Consequentialists or Instrumentalists?mentioning

confidence: 98%

“…The crucial point is that this reply is genuinely consequentialist. In their more recent paper (Dunn and Ahlstrom-Vij 2017), they argue that some versions of consequentialism can avoid the trade-off problems and process reliabilism is one of them.…”

Section: Consequentialists or Instrumentalists?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In their later paper, Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn argue that consequentialism doesn't need to consider all consequences: for example, act consequentialism considers only the consequences of the act evaluated, and rule consequentialism only consequences of the rule when people comply. So, they conclude that it is fine for reliabilism to consider only the consequences directly produced by the process (Dunn and Ahlstrom-Vij 2017: sec. 4).…”

Section: Consequentialists or Instrumentalists?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Are There Any Epistemic Consequentialists?

2020

Episteme

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Selim Berker argues (1) that epistemic consequentialism is pervasive in epistemology and (2) that epistemic consequentialism is structurally flawed. (1) is incorrect, however. I distinguish between epistemic consequentialism and epistemic instrumentalism and argue that most putative consequentialists should be considered instrumentalists. I also identify the structural problem of epistemic consequentialism Berker attempts to pinpoint and show that epistemic instrumentalism does not have the consequentialist problem.

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Section: Consequentialists or Instrumentalists?mentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Consequentialists or Instrumentalists?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Consequentialists or Instrumentalists?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Are There Any Epistemic Consequentialists?

2020

Episteme

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“…However, the resulting view might be taken to be obviously incorrect. Consider a recent case offered by Julia Driver (2018): Conrad is the sort of person who consistently offers very bad arguments for his beliefs. Almost all of his beliefs are false, and yet he manages, amazingly, to survive.…”

Section: Advice For Former Reliabilistsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since Conrad's conclusions are invariably false, his interlocutors always come away with true beliefs. (Driver 2018: 119)…”

Section: Advice For Former Reliabilistsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why No True Reliabilist Should Endorse Reliabilism

Ahlström-Vij

Dunn

2020

Episteme

Self Cite

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Critics have recently argued that reliabilists face trade-off problems, forcing them to condone intuitively unjustified beliefs when they generate lots of true belief further downstream. What these critics overlook is that reliabilism entails that there are side-constraints on belief-formation, on account of which there are some things you should not believe, even if doing so would have very good epistemic consequences. However, we argue that by embracing side-constraints the reliabilist faces a dilemma: she can either hold on to reliabilism, and with it aforementioned side-constraints, but then needs to explain why we should allow the pursuit of justification to get in the way of the acquisition of true belief; or she can deny that there are side-constraints – and in effect give up on reliabilism. We'll suggest that anyone moved by the considerations that likely attract people to reliabilism in the first place – the idea the true belief is good, and as such should be promoted – should go for the second horn, and instead pursue a form of epistemic utilitarianism.

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Epistemic Consequentialism: Haters Gonna Hate

Sharadin

2018

Metaepistemology

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Epistemic consequentialism has been charged with ignoring the epistemic separateness of propositions and with (thereby) allowing trade-offs between propositions. Here, I do two things. First, I investigate the metaphor of the epistemic separateness of propositions. I argue that either (i) the metaphor is meaningfully unpacked in a way that is modeled on the moral separateness of persons, in which case it doesn't support a ban on trade-offs or (ii) it isn't meaningfully unpacked, in which case it really doesn't support a ban on trade-offs. Second, I consider the strategy of arguing against the trade-off permitting conception of epistemic rationality that is central to epistemic consequentialism on the basis of our intuitive verdicts about the permissibility of trade-offs in cases. I argue the execution of this strategy suffers a methodological mistake that, once corrected, vitiates the probative value of those intuitive verdicts. Hence the conclusion: the separateness of propositions provides no support for a ban on trade-offs, and an influential independent argument for such a ban is flawed.

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Is Reliabilism a Form of Consequentialism?

Cited by 9 publications

References 12 publications

Are There Any Epistemic Consequentialists?

Are There Any Epistemic Consequentialists?

Why No True Reliabilist Should Endorse Reliabilism

Epistemic Consequentialism: Haters Gonna Hate

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