Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?

Romanò, Roberta

doi:10.2139/ssrn.693484

Cited by 10 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 28 publications

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“…85 It is said thus that market forces require directors to choose a beneficial regime and a 'race to the top' ensues. 86 This brings benefits such as reduced costs, greater expertise and legal certainty. 87 While lessons may be learned from the USA, as Deakin pointed out, the Delaware experience is unlikely to be repeated in the EU as the EU is on a different trajectory reflecting the particular conditions under which the national systems evolved and under which the harmonisation programme developed.…”

Section: Regulatory Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Takeover Directive: Is a Little Regulation Better Than No Regulation?

Clarke

2009

European Law Journal

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This article examines Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids through a regulatory lens in order to determine its effectiveness as a regulatory mechanism. A central regulatory problem for European legislators is to determine the optimal balance between harmonisation and diversity, and the directive reflects the balance which was struck. The article questions whether the resulting 'light regulatory touch' may have jeopardised the existing efficient self-regulatory regime which operates in the UK (the largest European takeover market), while simultaneously undermining the directive's goal of facilitating takeovers and yielding a level playing field.

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Section: Regulatory Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%