Is reasoning from counterfactual antecedents evidence for counterfactual reasoning?

Abstract

In most developmental studies the only error children could make on counterfactual tasks was to answer with the current state of affairs. It was concluded that children who did not show this error are able to reason counterfactually. However, children might have avoided this error by using basic conditional reasoning (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010). Basic conditional reasoning takes an antecedent, which like in counterfactual reasoning can be counter to fact, and combines it with a conditional (or set of conditionals reflecting knowledge of how the world works) to draw a likely conclusion. A critical feature of counterfactual reasoning then is that these additional assumptions be modelled after the actual events to which the counterfactual is taken to be counterfactual. In contrast in basic conditional reasoning one enriches the given antecedent with any plausible assumptions. In our tasks basic conditional reasoning leads to different answers than counterfactual reasoning. For instance, a doctor, sitting in the park with the intention to read a paper, is called to an emergency at the swimming pool. The question, "if there had been no emergency, where would the doctor be?" should counterfactually be answered "in the park". But ignoring the doctor's intentions and just reasoning on plausible grounds one might answer: "in the hospital". Only by 6 years, did children give mostly correct answers.

Children's Counterfactual Reasoning About Causally Overdetermined Events

“…These studies primarily required children to reason about counterfactual conditionals from counterfactual antecedents, without having to incorporate other aspects of reality into their counterfactual representation (Rafetseder & Perner, ) and without having to consider multiple possibilities simultaneously (Beck & Riggs, ). Studies that have required children to consider multiple possibilities (e.g., reality and a counterfactual possibility) have found that children do not succeed until age 5 or 6 (Beck & Guthrie, ; Beck et al., ; Perner et al., ; Rafetseder & Perner, ). Those that have required children to exercise the nearest possible world constraint have found that children do not pass until as late as adolescence (Rafetseder et al., , ).…”

“…It is also worth mentioning that one study by Rafetseder and Perner () found that children were able to engage in counterfactual reasoning by the age of 6. They gave children change‐of‐location counterfactual scenarios, in which a character was in a typical or atypical location when he was called to another location.…”

Counterfactual reasoning: From childhood to adulthood

“…Although the gain of inhibitory control might serve as an explanation for why children stop committing the reality bias on false belief and counterfactual questions (see also Rafetseder & Perner, 2010), it hardly explains why even older children give wrong answers on our critical conditions. The interference of reality with what needs to be counterfactually assumed is the same among all conditions; the girl comes instead of the boy, and so the candy would be somewhere else than where it really is.…”

“…In their study, children received antecedent and consequent counterfactual tasks. In the consequent version, they were asked counterfactual questions such as “If there had not been a fire, where would Peter be?” These are tasks that even very young children can solve correctly (Riggs et al, 1998), most likely because they are using simpler reasoning strategies (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). In the antecedent tasks, children were asked to imagine that they had made the floor dirty.…”

The development of mental scenario building and episodic foresight

“…This is not to say, however, that mental object substitution implies that toddlers can construct and compare multiple scenarios as typically required for effective episodic foresight . Only from around ages three to four do children show signs of counterfactual thinking, allowing them to contrast an event that did happen with a similar event that did not happen, and some data point to an even later time of emergence …”