Is Putin' Power More Formal Than Real?

Reddaway, Peter

doi:10.1080/1060586x.2002.10641511

Cited by 30 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Measuring the market value of the top five private firms (Yukos, LUKoil, Surgutneftegaz, Sibneft, Norilsk Nikel) as a proportion of GDP shows that these firms are worth 24.4 percent of 5 See discussions in Reddaway (2002) Russia's annual output. The largest firms are concentrated in oil and metals, but they also have interests in banking, car manufacturing, and increasingly in agricultural production.…”

Section: Institutional Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Patterns of Corruption in the Russian Regions

Dininio¹,

Orttung

2005

World Pol.

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Corruption is one of the key problems facing the Russian state as it seeks to evolve out of its socialist past. Naturally, regional patterns of corruption exist across a country as large and diverse as the Russian Federation. To explain these variations, the authors analyze 2002 data from Transparency International and the Information for Democracy Foundation that provide the first effort to measure differences in the incidence of corruption across forty Russian regions. They find that corruption in Russia is fueled by the size of government and by the level of development. Within each region, the amount of corruption increases as the number of bureaucrats grows and gross regional product per capita decreases. Russian policymakers can therefore work to reduce corruption by effectively reforming or scaling back bureaucracies and by encouraging economic development outside of the key centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

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Section: Institutional Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Patterns of Corruption in the Russian Regions

Dininio¹,

Orttung

2005

World Pol.

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“…Although the Russian business community was considerably weakened by the 1998 financial crisis in the country, the business sector is now even more concentrated than South Korea's was in the period Kang studied. Kang Measuring the market value of the top five private firms (Yukos, LUKoil, Surgutneftegaz, Sibneft, Norilsk Nikel) as a proportion of GDP shows that these firms are worth 24.4 percent of 5 See discussions in Reddaway (2002) and chapters by Igor Klyamkin and Marie Mendras in Mendras (2003 , 1993).…”

Section: David Kang's Crony Capitalism Seeks To Explain Different Levmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Patterns of Corruption in the Russian Regions

Dininio

Orttung²

2005

SSRN Journal

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Corruption is one of the key problems facing the Russian state as it seeks to evolve out of its socialist past. Naturally, regional patterns of corruption exist across a country as large and diverse as the Russian Federation. To explain these variations, we analyze 2002 data from Transparency International and the Information for Democracy Foundation that provides the first effort to measure differences in incidence of corruption across 40 Russian regions. We find that corruption in Russia primarily is a structural problem, and not one related to its institutions. Within each region, the amount of corruption increases as the size of the regional economy grows, the per capita income decreases, and the population decreases. Russian policymakers can therefore work to reduce corruption by encouraging economic development outside of the key centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Because the data show that voter turnout also lowers corruption, policymakers can also fight corruption by fostering more political accountability in elections.

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“…Many key figures from Boris Yeltsin's inner circle, such as the head of the presidential administration Aleksander Voloshin and Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov (Ross, 2004), remained in power. In the scholarly literature of the time, Putin was often portrayed as a balancer of elite factions inherited from the Yeltsin era rather than an effective leader of the ruling group (Reddaway, 2002).…”

Section: The Dynamics Of Vladimir Putin's Political Regimementioning

confidence: 99%

The place of Russia’s political regime (2003–2023) on a conceptual map of the world’s autocracies

Golosov

2023

Social Science Information

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This study places Russia’s political regime into a comparative perspective by developing a conceptual framework that classifies authoritarian regimes along two dimensions, those of regime-specific institutionalization and electoral institutionalization. The resulting conceptual map places Russia’s political regime of 2003–2023 into the category of regimes that, while including an electoral component, score relatively low on the dimension of regime-specific institutionalization. At the same time, the conceptual map allows for tracing the regime’s evolution along the two dimensions. The analysis reveals that over time, the regime has undergone a staged transformation from electoral authoritarianism with relatively strong, albeit mostly informal, constraints on the exercise of executive power to a full-fledged personalist dictatorship. This process was finalized after the 2020 constitutional amendments, and became manifest in Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine in 2022.

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Is Putin' Power More Formal Than Real?

Cited by 30 publications

References 1 publication

Explaining Patterns of Corruption in the Russian Regions

Explaining Patterns of Corruption in the Russian Regions

Explaining Patterns of Corruption in the Russian Regions

The place of Russia’s political regime (2003–2023) on a conceptual map of the world’s autocracies

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