Is Neo‐Republicanism Bad for Women?

Costa, M. Victoria

doi:10.1111/hypa.12002

Cited by 21 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…15 One of the writers who defended a sympathy based social reform, and who has been marginalized-to the extent that she is now practically unknown-is Sophie de Grouchy. In what follows I show how she develops a 13 See Philips (2000), Costa (2012) and Pateman (2007). 14 This take on the problem, i.e.…”

Section: The Origins Of Sympathy-a Care-based Republicanismmentioning

confidence: 98%

Is Motherhood Compatible with Political Participation? Sophie de Grouchy’s Care-Based Republicanism

Bergès

2014

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Motherhood, as it is practiced, constitutes an obstacle to gender equality in political participation. Several options are available as a potential solution to this problem. One is to advice women not to become mothers, or if they do, to devote less time and energy to caring for their children. However this will have negative repercussions for those who need to be cared for, whether children, sick people or the elderly. A second solution is to reject the view that political participation is an important or necessary part of human flourishing, and allow that those who engage in caring activities can live good lives without having a say in how they are ruled. This has negative consequences for the carers who find themselves in a position, if not of direct oppression, of being dominated, and therefore susceptible of being oppressed. The solution I propose, inspired by the writings of Sophie de Grouchy, is that we look for a form of republicanism that regards caring activities as a form of political participation.

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Section: The Origins Of Sympathy-a Care-based Republicanismmentioning

confidence: 98%

Is Motherhood Compatible with Political Participation? Sophie de Grouchy’s Care-Based Republicanism

Bergès

2014

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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“…For example, some explore how far republicanism helps us reconstruct views by historical figures, such as Mary Wollstonecraft and Catharine Macaulay, and the lessons we can learn from them (Coffee, 2013a(Coffee, , 2013b(Coffee, , 2018Halldenius, 2019). Other writers explore how well contemporary republicanism suitably captures feminist normative concerns (Costa, 2013;Einspahr, 2010;Halldenius, 2014;Knowles, 2019;Phillips, 2000).…”

Section: Conclusion and New Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Freedom in Political Philosophy

Schmidt¹

2022

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics

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Freedom is among the central values in political philosophy. Freedom also features heavily in normative arguments in ethics, politics, and law. Yet different sides often invoke freedom to establish very different conclusions. Some argue that freedom imposes strict constraints on state power. For example, when promoting public health, there is a limit on how far the state can interfere with individual freedom. Others, in contrast, argue that freedom is not just a constraint but also an important goal of state power and collective action. Good public health policy, for example, promotes people’s freedom. Of course, different arguments often draw on different theories of freedom. So, to evaluate such arguments, we need to analyze these different theories and their implications and assess their plausibility. The broadly liberal tradition views freedom as being about external options. Such theories typically start with an account of when someone has a specific freedom or unfreedom to do something. For example, some argue that only a narrow set of interpersonal interferences count as constraints on freedom. Others argue that a far broader set of factors, including ill health and natural constraints, can reduce one’s freedom. Since the 1980s and 1990s, scholarship has increasingly recognized that to use liberal freedom in normative arguments, one must move beyond specific freedom and unfreedom. Most laws and policies both subtract and add specific freedoms. What matters is how a person’s freedom is affected overall. Philosophers and economists have thus engaged in intricate debates about how to measure overall freedom. Moreover, policies and law affect not only one person at one point in time but also multiple persons across time. So, liberal freedom-based arguments also require distributive criteria for intertemporal and interpersonal distributions of freedom. In the early 21st century, republicanism has developed into a prominent alternative to liberal theories. Republicans argue that being a free person is not just, or not even primarily, about liberal option-freedom. Freedom requires being free from dominating power. Republicans and liberals have engaged in a lively debate on who offers the better theory. In developing the republican ideal, republicans also engage in intramural debates. For example, is domination primarily an interpersonal or structural phenomenon? And what economic institutions does republicanism imply? Theorizing around freedom has become richer and moved from narrower questions regarding specific freedom and unfreedom to overall freedom and to republican theories of nondomination. But recent theorizing also seeks to extend its focus and scope. Historically, theorizing started with the freedom of able-bodied male citizens within nation states. Recent theorizing shifts the focus to include issues around gender, disability, freedom at the international level, and the freedom of nonhuman animals and future generations. Beyond fascinating implications of existing theories, a more inclusive focus is likely to also yield important lessons on how current theories can be improved.

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“…If the substance of what interferers do is irrelevant, it would seem that all interferees who lack control are subject to domination. Feminist critics have argued that this applies poorly to children: Loving parents interfere with their children in ways that do not accord with their thoughts and opinions; these children do not appear to be dominated despite their relative lack of control (Costa 2013, 928–29; Friedman 2008, 252–57). Others have objected to the idea that accountability could be sufficient to prevent domination.…”

Section: Domination and The Need For Moral Educationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Domination and Care in Rousseau'sEmile

Fraistat

2016

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Domination, understood as the abusive or capricious employment of power over others for the sake of one's own ends, is among the gravest threats to human freedom. Solving the problem of domination is a crucial normative challenge, and this article identifies in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau a promising and overlooked avenue for addressing it. I propose an interpretation of Rousseau'sEmilein which preventing domination requires moral education in the practice and value of care. This interpretation gives Rousseau new relevance as a theorist of domination. In connecting non-dominative to educative care, Rousseau's approach has the potential to forge new connections between neo-republican theories of domination and feminist care ethics, even suggesting new routes by which public policy might foster a non-dominative society.

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Is Neo‐Republicanism Bad for Women?

Cited by 21 publications

References 16 publications

Is Motherhood Compatible with Political Participation? Sophie de Grouchy’s Care-Based Republicanism

Is Motherhood Compatible with Political Participation? Sophie de Grouchy’s Care-Based Republicanism

Freedom in Political Philosophy

Domination and Care in Rousseau'sEmile

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