Is more institutional coup-proofing better or worse for regime protection? Evidence from the Philippines, 1986–1987

Marcum, Anthony; Brown, Jonathan N.

doi:10.1080/02185377.2017.1284681

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…In particular, a number of scholars have analyzed whether counterbalancing the military with other security forces prevents coups (e.g. Horowitz, 1985;Quinlivan, 1999;Powell, 2012;Böhmelt & Pilster, 2015;Marcum & Brown, 2017;De Bruin, 2018). Other research has focused on how the organization and staffing of security forces affect incentives for repression (Greitens, 2016;Blank, 2017); regime durability (Policzer, 2009); military defection (McLauchlin, 2010;Morency-Laflamme & McLauchlin, 2019); and battlefield effectiveness (Pilster & Böhmelt, 2011;Talmadge, 2015).…”

Section: Existing Research and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Mapping coercive institutions: The State Security Forces dataset, 1960–2010

Bruin

2020

Journal of Peace Research

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How rulers organize and use their security forces is thought to have important implications for regime survival, repression, and military effectiveness. While a number of studies provide insight into the coercive institutions of individual states, efforts to understand systematic patterns have been hampered by a lack of reliable data on state security forces that can be compared across states and within them over time. This article presents the State Security Forces (SSF) dataset, which includes 375 security forces in 110 countries, 1960–2010. It tracks how each force is commanded, staffed, equipped, and deployed, as well as the number of security forces and potential counterweights in each state’s security sector as a whole. After illustrating how the SSF dataset differs from related ones and presenting descriptive trends, the article shows how it can be used to deepen our understanding of coup-proofing and strategic substitution, and identifies additional research uses of the dataset.

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Section: Existing Research and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Mapping coercive institutions: The State Security Forces dataset, 1960–2010

Bruin

2020

Journal of Peace Research

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“…Second, I review a growing literature that shows vulnerable leaders structurally coup-proof their regimes by building up “mutually suspicious” military organizations that “counterbalance” each other (Belkin & Schofer, 2003). Further analyses have demonstrated these coup-proofing efforts can effectively reduce the likelihood of coups (De Bruin, 2017; Marcum & Brown, 2017; Pilster & Böhmelt, 2015; Powell, 2012; Quinlivan, 1999; Rabinowitz & Jargowski, 2017; Rwengabo, 2012) and substantially weaken the military capacity of the state (e.g., Narang & Talmadge, 2017; Pilster & Böhmelt, 2011). Third, I argue for a conditional relationship between coup-proofing and civil war onset.…”

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confidence: 99%

Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict: A Coup-Proofing Paradox

Powell

2017

Armed Forces & Society

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It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite their states being plagued with rebellion. Scholarship has argued the practice of coup-proofing is potentially responsible for this trend. However, though regular armed forces are often allowed to whither when coup-proofing, states often retain substantial capabilities in the form of well-armed and well-trained coup-proofing units. This article argues that coup-proofing is more likely to contribute to rebellion when leaders are hesitant to deploy their coup-proofing units: when coup risk is high. Using a global sample of authoritarian regimes for the years 1971–2011, tests indicate that heavily coup-proofed regimes do in fact see a considerable increase in civil war likelihood when the risk of a coup is high but see no change in conflict propensity when coup risk is low.

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Mapping Coercive Institutions: The State Security Forces Dataset, 1960-2010

Bruin

2017

SSRN Journal

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Is more institutional coup-proofing better or worse for regime protection? Evidence from the Philippines, 1986–1987

Cited by 4 publications

References 39 publications

Mapping coercive institutions: The State Security Forces dataset, 1960–2010

Mapping coercive institutions: The State Security Forces dataset, 1960–2010

Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict: A Coup-Proofing Paradox

Mapping Coercive Institutions: The State Security Forces Dataset, 1960-2010

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