Is It Desirable to Be Able to Do the Undesirable? Moral Bioenhancement and the Little Alex Problem

Abstract

It has been argued that moral bioenhancement is desirable even if it would make it impossible for us to do what is morally required. Others find this apparent loss of freedom deplorable. However, it is difficult to see how a world in which there is no moral evil can plausibly be regarded as worse than a world in which people are not only free to do evil, but also where they actually do it, which would commit us to the seemingly paradoxical view that, under certain circumstances, the bad can be better than the good. Notwithstanding, this view is defended here.

Enhancing Care

“…But as Hauskeller notes, humans have already considerably expanded their circles of moral concern, so that they do not relate only with their own 'kin and a small circle of acquaintances', but also with people from different countries, societies and races. 63 With a full acknowledgment of people as situated in their webs of care, or by making visible the webs of care that surround us, we can no longer maintain an ethical concept of "individuals" as autonomous, independent, and abstract agents. Human life builds up in clusters of people and not in isolation.…”

Moral Bio-enhancement, Freedom, Value and the Parity Principle

“…The objection is that it is not clear that the freedom to fall is sufficiently valuable for Harris' purposes. In most cases, we have very strong moral reasons to prevent individuals from being able to carry out acts of extreme violence, and it does not seem that taking away a person's freedom to carry out such violence would be a great loss (DeGrazia 2014, 365;Savulescu and Persson 2012;Douglas 2013a;Hauskeller 2017;Bublitz 2016). …”

“…In order to explain why the violation of this sort of relational freedom is morally significant, Hauskeller appeals to the Habermasian claim that such "instrumentalization of nature might change the "ethical self-understanding of the species in such a way that we may no longer see ourselves as ethically free and morally equal beings guided by norms and reasons" (Hauskeller 2017). NCMBEs are thus likely to change the way in which we view ourselves and each other; more specifically, we might come to view human beings as unfree, as under the domination of another's will.…”

“…NCMBEs are thus likely to change the way in which we view ourselves and each other; more specifically, we might come to view human beings as unfree, as under the domination of another's will. Yet, in becoming subjugated to this will, Hauskeller claims that human beings would thereby become 'means to the end of morality' rather than ends in themselves' (Hauskeller 2017). NCMBEs would thus undermine a freedom that undergirds the whole enterprise of morality.…”

“…13 Verkiel (2017) seems to capture a similar claim when she writes that NCMBEs would only allow for amoral enhancement. Hauskeller criticizes Harris' argument on the basis that the claim that virtue itself is important is only convincing on a theistic framework (Hauskeller 2017). Despite his appeal to Milton's God, it is not clear that Harris understands himself to require this framework, given his secular approach to ethics.…”