2005
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.664981
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by the Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK

Abstract: We

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
44
0
1

Year Published

2009
2009
2017
2017

Publication Types

Select...
8
2

Relationship

0
10

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 51 publications
(48 citation statements)
references
References 80 publications
2
44
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…Perbedaan terhadap risiko dijelaskan oleh Amihud dan Lev (1981) bahwa shareholders lebih berkepentingan terhadap risiko sistematis, sedangkan manajer lebih berkepentingan terhadap risiko tidak sistematis. Pawlina dan Renneboog (2005) menjelaskan bahwa konflik ini terjadi dalam perusahaan dengan free cash flows yang besar karena manajer akan melakukan investasi atas kelebihan kas yang diperoleh dari sumber dana internal ini untuk mengoptimalkan keuntungan pribadinya dengan tidak melakukan pembayaran dividen tunai kepada pemegang saham.…”
Section: Teori Keagenanunclassified
“…Perbedaan terhadap risiko dijelaskan oleh Amihud dan Lev (1981) bahwa shareholders lebih berkepentingan terhadap risiko sistematis, sedangkan manajer lebih berkepentingan terhadap risiko tidak sistematis. Pawlina dan Renneboog (2005) menjelaskan bahwa konflik ini terjadi dalam perusahaan dengan free cash flows yang besar karena manajer akan melakukan investasi atas kelebihan kas yang diperoleh dari sumber dana internal ini untuk mengoptimalkan keuntungan pribadinya dengan tidak melakukan pembayaran dividen tunai kepada pemegang saham.…”
Section: Teori Keagenanunclassified
“…In addition, the suppliers of credit may engage in credit rationing or reduce their stakes in a firm trying to diversify their risk by "investing" only partially in some projects (see Fazzari et al, 1987, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981and Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005, for discussions on financing constraints issues). The setting we employ here allows for the optimal investment timing, optimal capital structure decisions and optimal/endogenous default on risky debt by equity holders.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, the empirical evidence shows that cash flow always has a signficant positive effect on accumulation, whilst the effects of the stock market evaluation and debt are mixed (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990;Bond and Meghir, 1994;Bond et al, 2003;Bloom et al, 2007). The mainstream investment literature argues that companies' financing issues mainly derive from agency problems, and the development of financial markets can relax these constraints (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990;Love, 2003;Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005;Love and Zicchino, 2006;Guariglia and Carpenter, 2008;Bond et al, 2003). In particular, Beck et al (2005) find that firms with higher financing obstacles shows slower growth, but this relationship is weaker in countries with relatively more developed financial systems.…”
Section: Accumulation Of Fixed Assets Liquidity and Financialisationmentioning
confidence: 99%