Is Imagery a Functional Component of the "Bizarre Imagery" Phenomenon?

Tests of a Cognitive-Resource-Allocation Account of the Bizarreness Effect

“…Specifically, in Experiment 1, image-formation time differences were significant and unique predictors of differences in common and bizarre target-word recall. Although previous researchers (e.g., Anderson & Buyer, 1994;Weir & Richman, 1996;Worthen, 1997) have demonstrated that image formation is unnecessary for bizarreness effects to occur, the relationship between image formation and recall in Experiment 1 warranted further investigation-that is, despite the lack of compelling evidence supporting our measure of cognitive-resource allocation during comprehension as an explanation of bizarreness effects, cognitive-resource allocation during imaging may provide more insight into the existence of the bizarre recall advantage. We designed Experiment 3 to test that possibility by using lists containing equal numbers of common and bizarre items.…”

“…Specifically, the imagery multiprocess model (IMP) described by Wollen and Margres suggests that the differences in recall between common and bizarre items may be the result of fluctuations in the amount of cognitive resources allocated toward the formation of common and bizarre mental images. Although recent findings regarding the non-necessity of mental imagery in obtaining bizarreness effects (Anderson & Buyer, 1994;Weir & Richman, 1996;Worthen, 1997) are damaging to the IMP model as a whole, the cognitive-resource-allocation component of the model does not rely on mental imagery and may warrant further consideration. Therefore, we examined the cognitive-resource-allocation mechanism described by Wollen and Margres in more detail.…”

“…Specifically, previous examinations of the relationship between processing time and the bizarreness effect have measured image-formation time as a measure of processing (Hauk et al, 1976;Nappe & Wollen, 1973). That approach is problematic because, as mentioned previously, recent research has questioned the importance of imagery in obtaining bizarreness effects (Anderson & Buyer, 1994;Weir & Richman, 1996;Worthen, 1997). Second, the research that has not focused exclusively on image-formation time as a measure of processing has not disentangled imaginal from verbal processing.…”

The impact of processing time on the bizarreness and orthographic distinctiveness effects

“…For instance, according to McDaniel and Einstein (1989) and Kline and Groninger (1991), increased sentence complexity makes it difficult to image the event, and allowing more time for processing complex sentences, especially bizarre sentences, facilitates the imageability of the event and restores the bizarreness effect. However, the reasoning of Kline and Groninger is not supported by studies showing that mental imagery is not the key to obtaining the bizarreness effect (Anderson & Buyer, 1994; Weir & Richman, 1996; Worthen, 1997). Data from the work of Anderson and Buyer (1994) even support the view that, although bizarre materials are better remembered than common materials, imaging interferes with rather than facilitates recall.…”

Humour mediates the facilitative effect of bizarreness in delayed recall

“…Cornoldi, Cavedon, De Beni, & Pra Baldi, 1988; McDaniel & Einstein, 1986, 1991) have suggested that mental imagery mediates the effects of bizarre elaboration and, as a result, the phrase ‘bizarre imagery effect’ has often been used to describe the facilitative effects of bizarre elaboration on memory. However, empirical research has demonstrated that the facilitative effects of bizarreness are affected by neither a significant reduction in mental imagery formation (Weir & Richman, 1996; Worthen, 1997) nor differences in imaging ability (Anderson & Buyer, 1994; Zoller, Workman, & Kroll, 1989).…”