Is fixed-mobile substitution strong enough to de-regulate fixed voice telephony? Evidence from the Austrian markets

Briglauer, Wolfgang; Schwarz, Anton; Zulehner, Christine

doi:10.1007/s11149-010-9132-1

Cited by 52 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…More interesting would be if mobile competition would sufficiently constrain market power in fixed access networks so that wholesale enduser access and/or unbundled local loops and back-hauls could be deregulated. However, currently measured demand elasticities are far below that hurdle (STUMPF 2007 andZULEHNER 2011). This holds, although, because of the large difference between marginal cost and LRAIC for fixed network access, the relevant cross effect need not be large.…”

Section: Geographic Differentiation Of Wholesale Access Regulationmentioning

confidence: 94%

The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey

Vogelsang

2013

Review of Economics

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Telecommunications policy has come a long way from regulation of vertically integrated monopolies to the current state of competition. As competition becomes selfsustainable, will telecommunications policy in the form of industry-specific regulation go away or, if not, what form will it take? The economics literature suggests that the regulatory efficiency frontier is shifted by new technological and market developments, such as convergence of networks, fixed-mobile substitution (and integration) and next generation access networks. The frontier is also affected by the existing capital stock and other physical and institutional characteristics of a country. The insights from a review of the theoretical and empirical literature are applied to five policy areas. They are: (1) termination monopoly; (2) local bottleneck access; (3) net neutrality; (4) spectrum management; and (5) universal service. While in some of them, deregulation and a move to competition policy will soon be the efficient state of the art, regulation will remain efficient in others for some time. Deregulation will likely become efficient for one-way access and universal service, with the exception of some universal service policies in remote areas and for the poor. Termination will move to bill and keep with a duty to interconnect. In addition, some (more symmetric) regulation should persist for net neutrality in the form of transparency requirements, (quasi-) common carrier obligations and minimum quality standards. Also, spectrum management, while moving towards full-blown ownership rights, will continue to see regulators providing zoning and other services, particularly for unlicensed spectrum. All these assessments are premised on the success of making additional spectrum as the key resource available. They are also premised on the absence of a killer technology like P2P FTTH that potentially dominates all other technologies. What determines the endgame in telecommunications regulation? Although technical and market developments will dominantly shape the regulatory efficiency frontier, institutional and political economy factors have an additional and mostly slowing effect on policy changes. (JEL: L43; L86; L96; L98.

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Section: Geographic Differentiation Of Wholesale Access Regulationmentioning

confidence: 94%

The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey

Vogelsang

2013

Review of Economics

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“…Ward and Woroch (2010) or Briglauer et al (2011) and references therein) are a valuable source of theoretical predictions.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Money and Privacy Android Market Evidence

Kummer

Schulte

2014

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. AbstractWe study the role of privacy in the market for mobile applications. For such programs used with smartphones and tablet PCs a very important market has emerged. Yet, neither the role of privacy on that market is well understood, nor do we have empirical evidence regarding its role therein. We exploit data on 300,000 mobile applications and almost 600 "applications-pairs" to analyze both sides of this market: First, we analyze the price that application suppliers charge for more privacy. Second, we study how users' installations are related to the "personal data greediness" of mobile applications.We provide the first empirical evidence on the main assumptions of recent early models on suppliers' and consumers' strategies in this market. Our results show that (1) consumers take it into account when applications request rights to collect private information and (2) suppliers ask for more rights if they offer an app for free than if they offer it for a fee.

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“…The competition between fixed and mobile for voice services has been studied in at least six papers [4][5][6][7][8][9]. Econometric analysis provides some evidence of fixed to mobile substitution effects for voice service at the country level [9], [12], [13].…”

Section: Related Literature Related Literature Related Literature Relmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The work of M.Rodini et al (2003) [9] proves that the extent of fixed-mobile substitution has important regulatory implications toward fixed network unbundling, fixed-mobile vertical separation, and universal service. The work of Wolfgang Briglauer, Anton Schwarz and Christine Zulehner concludes that the retail market for national calls of private users could probably be deregulated due to sufficient competitive pressure generated by mobile sector on the Austrian market [6]. To the author's knowledge, few studies have examined the issue related to fixed-mobile substitution for broadband data access services.…”

Section: Related Literature Related Literature Related Literature Relmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition Between Fixed and Mobile Broadband Access Based on Mobility and Data Volume

Liang

2010

SSRN Journal

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Is fixed-mobile substitution strong enough to de-regulate fixed voice telephony? Evidence from the Austrian markets

Abstract: Fixed-mobile substitution, Fixed networks, Voice telephony, Market definition, Hypothetical monopolist test, (De-)regulation, C32, L43, L51, L96,

Cited by 52 publications

References 22 publications

The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey

The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey

Money and Privacy Android Market Evidence

Competition Between Fixed and Mobile Broadband Access Based on Mobility and Data Volume

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