Is Fairness in the Eye of the Beholder? An Impartial Spectator Analysis of Justice

Konow, James

doi:10.2139/ssrn.980356

Cited by 16 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…The connection between responsibility and redistributive preferences has been uncovered using vignette‐based surveys, large‐scale national or international surveys, and laboratory experiments. Summarizing this research, when people perceive that advantages are self‐determined, (1) vignette‐based surveys show that people are less likely to find redistribution to be fair (Chavanne, ; Faravelli, ; Gaertner and Schwettmann, ; Konow, , , ; Schokkaert and Capeau, ; Schokkaert and Overlaet, ; Schokkaert and Devooght, ), (2) large‐scale surveys within or across nations show that people are less likely to support redistributive policies (Alesina and La Ferrara, ; Boarini and Le Clainche, ; Corneo and Gruner, ; Fong, ; Gaeta, ; Luttmer, ; Kangas, ), and (3) laboratory experiments show that people have more tolerance for unequal outcomes (Burrows and Loomes, ; Cappelen et al., , ; Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden, ; Chavanne, McCabe, and Paganelli, ; Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren, ; Dickinson and Tiefenthaler, ; Durante, Putterman, and Weele, ; Fong, ; Fong and Oberholzer‐Gee, ; Hoffman et al., ; Krawczyk, ; Konow, ; Oxoby and Spraggon, ; Ruffle, ). A subset of these experiments (Cappelen et al., , ; Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden, ; Konow, ) vary the degree to which contributions to a jointly owned distributable pie stem from effort or luck and allow the precise measurement of each type of contribution.…”

Section: Luck Effort and Redistributive Preferences: Surveys And Exmentioning

confidence: 99%

Headwinds, Tailwinds, and Preferences for Income Redistribution

Chavanne

2018

Social Science Quarterly

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Objective This study examines how preferences for income redistribution respond to information that points to the degree to which bad luck causes poverty and good luck causes wealth. Methods Survey respondents saw a vignette that described why someone is poor or a vignette that described why someone is wealthy; poverty and wealth were products of effort, various mixtures of effort and luck, one dimension of luck, or two dimensions of luck. Results Overall trends in the data show that redistribution is viewed more favorably as luck becomes marginally more important in causing both poverty and wealth. Pairwise comparisons of specific treatments show that responses to how degrees of bad luck cause poverty are more uniform and predictable than responses to how degrees of good luck cause wealth. Conclusion Redistributive preferences may be more malleable with respect to information that points to how bad luck contributes to poverty.

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Section: Luck Effort and Redistributive Preferences: Surveys And Exmentioning

confidence: 99%

Headwinds, Tailwinds, and Preferences for Income Redistribution

Chavanne

2018

Social Science Quarterly

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“…Although the moral intuitions that underlie preferences for debt‐related polices have not, to my knowledge, been examined empirically, existing work that addresses preferences for redistribution provide relevant insight. Vignette‐based surveys have found weaker (stronger) preferences for redistribution when respondents perceive that one's situation is within (beyond) her control (Schokkaert and Overlaet, ; Schokkaert and Capeau, ; Faravelli, ; Konow, , , ; Chavanne, ). Large‐scale national or international surveys have found similar results (Fong, ; Alesina and La Ferrara, ; Boarini and Le Clainche, ), as have laboratory experiments (Hoffman and Spitzer, ; Hoffman et al, ; Konow, ; Cherry et al, ; Dickinson and Tiefenthaler, ; Cappelen et al, ; Oxoby and Spraggon, ; Chavanne et al, ).…”

Section: Variables Of Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shaking Off Burdens – Debt Relief and Moral Intuitions

Chavanne¹

2017

Kyklos

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Summary Motivated by the prevalence of debt crises and the resulting policy debates, this study uses a vignette‐based survey to examine the moral intuitions that underlie debt‐related policy preferences. After reading a hypothetical scenario involving a debtor and a lender, survey respondents rate the degree of fairness that they attach to a third party's decision to allow debt relief. The experimental design varies (1) the responsibility of lenders and debtors in terms of whether their situations stem from bad luck or poor choices, (2) the salience of a lender's profit motive and (3) whether the debtor and the lender are individuals or corporations. The results show that debt relief is more likely to be found fair in a corporate context compared to a personalized context and that the factors that drive the perceived fairness of debt relief differ across corporate and personalized contexts. With corporate debt, debtor and lender responsibility are strongly, and consistently, linked to the perceived fairness of debt relief. With personalized debt, lender responsibility is never a significant driver of the perceived fairness of debt relief, and debtor responsibility only matters if the lender's profit motive is made salient.

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“…7 This may apply to bureaucratic organizations where superiors have to rate subordinates and where their own wage does not depend (at least not directly) on the performance of the promoted subordinates. In a broader perspective, the idea was to introduce an impartial third-party like in the theories of justice (see Konow, 2009). payoff to one of them.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ingratiation: Experimental evidence

Robin

Rusinowska

Villeval

2014

European Economic Review

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We investigate experimentally ingratiatory behavior expressed by opinion conformity. Both individuals' performance at a task and their opinions on various topics can be observed before unequal payoffs are assigned by a second mover. In some treatments, first movers can change their opinion after learning that held by the second mover. We find evidence of high ingratiation indices, as opinion conformity is rewarded. However, second movers reward conformity less when it is common knowledge that opinions can be manipulated strategically. Introducing a monetary cost for changing opinion reduces ingratiation. Introducing performance-related pay for the second mover makes ingratiation less rewarding but does not eliminate it completely. Reducing the noise in the measurement of ability has little effect.

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Is Fairness in the Eye of the Beholder? An Impartial Spectator Analysis of Justice

Cited by 16 publications

References 29 publications

Headwinds, Tailwinds, and Preferences for Income Redistribution

Headwinds, Tailwinds, and Preferences for Income Redistribution

Shaking Off Burdens – Debt Relief and Moral Intuitions

Ingratiation: Experimental evidence

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