China's global ambition to become a carbon-neutral economy by mid-century with one of the world's most modern militaries has attracted the significant attention of scholars worldwide. However, a modern and advanced economy with Chinese socialist characteristics (announced by President Xi Jinping in 2017) has not been received well in Washington or Brussels, with China being labelled a major systemic threat by both the US and the EU. The overwhelming focus on the so-called "systemic rivalry" between the US and China and, to a lesser extent, increasing bilateral China-Russia ties has diverted attention away from China's changing foreign policy engagement with smaller powers. This paper aims to fill this gap through a comparative analysis of the illustrative case studies of China's changing relationship over the past decade with Australia, as a US-aligned middle power; the Solomon Islands, as a small but strategically significant regional state in the Indo-Pacific region; and a selected number of Central and East European states (CEEC). The main hypothesis advanced here is that China has resorted to pragmatism and diversion in its foreign policy towards those countries in order to overcome challenges posed by US sanctions, increased scepticism regarding its foreign, defence, and security policy outlook, as well as the economic rise of China. Using both primary and secondary sources, this article aims to contribute to the ever-growing scholarship on China's foreign and security policy and soft power by identifying main trends over the past ten years in Chinese