Is behavioral pro-sociality game-specific? Pro-social preference and expectations of pro-sociality

Yamagishi, Toshio; Mifune, Nobuhiro; Li, Yang; Shinada, Mizuho; Hashimoto, Hirofumi; Horita, Yutaka; Miura, Arisa; Inukai, Keigo; Tanida, Shigehito; Kiyonari, Toko; Takagishi, Haruto; Simunovic, Dora

doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.06.002

Cited by 196 publications

(169 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…Our finding of strong within-individual correlations between play in our different cooperation games, as well as stability in cooperative play across time, is consistent with a previous study that found within-individual correlations in dyadic cooperation games played at different times by 108 Japanese participants 51 . We show that these correlations extend to the multi-player PGG, and a substantially larger sample of US residents.…”

Section: Article Nature Communications | Doi: 101038/ncomms5939supporting

confidence: 92%

Humans display a ‘cooperative phenotype’ that is domain general and temporally stable

2014

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Understanding human cooperation is of major interest across the natural and social sciences. But it is unclear to what extent cooperation is actually a general concept. Most research on cooperation has implicitly assumed that a person's behaviour in one cooperative context is related to their behaviour in other settings, and at later times. However, there is little empirical evidence in support of this assumption. Here, we provide such evidence by collecting thousands of game decisions from over 1,400 individuals. A person's decisions in different cooperation games are correlated, as are those decisions and both self-report and real-effort measures of cooperation in non-game contexts. Equally strong correlations exist between cooperative decisions made an average of 124 days apart. Importantly, we find that cooperation is not correlated with norm-enforcing punishment or non-competitiveness. We conclude that there is a domain-general and temporally stable inclination towards paying costs to benefit others, which we dub the 'cooperative phenotype'.

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Section: Article Nature Communications | Doi: 101038/ncomms5939supporting

confidence: 92%

Humans display a ‘cooperative phenotype’ that is domain general and temporally stable

2014

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“…Moreover, when attitudes to cooperation are elicited multiple times, most people fall into the same type categorization each time, that is, conditional cooperation and free riding are intra-personally stable attitudes (Volk, Thöni, and Ruigrok 2012). This observation supports evidence that people's other-or self-regarding behavior is consistent across games (Yamagishi et al 2013). …”

Section: Conditional Cooperation Predicts Contributionssupporting

confidence: 69%

Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order

Gächter¹

2014

The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis chapter presents some insights from basic behavioural research on the role of human pro-social motivation to maintain social order. I argue that social order can be conceptualised as a public good game. Past attempts to explain social order typically relied on the assumption of selfish and rational agents ("homo economicus"). The last twenty years of research in behavioural and experimental economics have challenged this view. After presenting the most important findings of recent research on human pro-sociality I discuss the evidence on three pillars of the maintenance of social order. The first pillar is internalised norms of cooperation, sustained by emotions such as guilt and shame. The second pillar is the behaviour of other people who typically are "conditional cooperators" willing to cooperate if others do so as well. This motivation can sustain cooperation if enough people cooperate but can jeopardise social order if many others follow selfish inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere threat without being executed much. The chapter also presents some evidence on the cross-cultural variability of some findings, in particular with regard to punishment behaviour. The chapter concludes with remarks on future research.

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“…The probable reason why no significant reciprocity appears to have been elicited in the decreasing payoff-difference game is that it was unnecessary. Equality-seeking is known from previous research to be a powerful motive in experimental games (e.g., Au & Kwong, 2004;Fehr & Schmidt, 1999;van den Bos et al, 2011;Van Lange 1999;Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997;Yamagishi et al, 2013), and this is the only one of our games in which cooperation has the incidental sideeffect of increasing equality. Cooperation on early rounds was far higher than in any of the other games, and although it declined slightly over later rounds, it remained higher than in any other game (see Figures 4 and 6).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Early research focused on the individualistic SVO (maximizing individual payoffs), the competitive SVO (maximizing relative payoffs), and the cooperative SVO (maximizing joint payoffs). Subsequently, the equality-seeking SVO (minimizing the difference between payoffs) and the altruistic SVO (maximizing the co-player's payoff) were added to the theory, and attention focused on a hybrid prosocial SVO combining the cooperative and equality-seeking orientations (e.g., Van Lange 1999; Yamagishi et al, 2013). Approximately 57% of people are predominantly cooperative, 27% predominantly individualistic, and 16% predominantly competitive (Au & Kwong, 2004), and SVO correlates significantly with personality descriptions given by friends and roommates (Bem & Lord, 1979) and predicts everyday activities, including volunteering for charitable causes (McClintock & Allison, 1989;Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, & Van Vugt, 2007 In two-player games, SVO can be formalized as follows (Colman, Körner, Musy, & Tazdaït, 2011).…”

Section: Social Value Orientation Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasons for cooperating in repeated interactions: Social value orientations, fuzzy traces, reciprocity, and activity bias.

et al. 2017

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Many human interactions involve patterns of turn-taking cooperation that can be modeled by the deeply paradoxical Centipede game. A backward induction argument suggests that cooperation is irrational in such interactions, but experiments have demonstrated that players cooperate frequently and earn better payoffs as a consequence. We formulate 6 competing theories of cooperation in Centipede games and report the results of 2 experiments, based on investigations of several closely matched games with different payoff structures and different methods of reaching decisions. The results show that turn-taking cooperation does not appear to be explained by reciprocity theory, activity bias theory, or a motive to maximize relative payoffs, but that collective rationality, in the form of a motive to maximize joint payoffs, and fuzzy-trace theory can explain cooperation in interactions of this type. Reciprocity increases cooperation across repeated games between fixed player pairs, but there is no evidence of reciprocity influencing cooperation within games.

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Is behavioral pro-sociality game-specific? Pro-social preference and expectations of pro-sociality

Cited by 196 publications

References 53 publications

Humans display a ‘cooperative phenotype’ that is domain general and temporally stable

Humans display a ‘cooperative phenotype’ that is domain general and temporally stable

Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order

Reasons for cooperating in repeated interactions: Social value orientations, fuzzy traces, reciprocity, and activity bias.

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