Is Approximation of an Ideal Defensible?

Abstract

What role does our knowledge about the ideal society play in guiding policymaking in the real world? One intuitive answer is to approximate. Namely, we have a duty to approximate the ideal within the relevant constraints of feasibility. However, political philosophers seem to have what might be called ‘approximatophobia'. Many philosophers, including idealists such as David Estlund, warn against approximation. Their criticism is chiefly motivated by ‘the problem of second best’, which points out that your second-best option may not be closest to your best option. This paper aims to dispel ‘approximatophobia'. The difficulty posed by the problem of second best is often overstated. More positively, I present a novel defence of approximation, arguing that approximation of an ideal can be a reasonably reliable default strategy of action guidance in the real world. Difficulties that may afflict the project of approximation can be mitigated by sophistication of the project of approximation. After showing that critics of approximation overstep their mark in issuing the strong or moderate warning against approximation, I propose an account of sophisticated approximation. It seeks a series of reforms that make existing social institutions closer to the ideal based on careful selection of frame of analysis. Three virtuous correlations are identified as indicators for successful project of approximation, linking descriptive similarity to desirability, feasibility and knowledge of the ideal. I also explain a two-staged strategy of sophisticating the way you approximate the ideal, with an expected positive feedback effect.

Making Sense of Race-Based Affirmative Action in Allocating Scarce Medical Resources

“…37 35 I borrowed this example from Fazelpour and Lipton 2020, 60. 36 Similarly, Dai Oba contended that "the approximation to the ideal" can be held as "a default strategy" even in the situations "plagued by grave injustice"; he argued that it should be "the first option to be considered," and while it can be "temporarily halted," we should "return to it once it becomes sensible" (Oba 2023). 37 Helene Gayle, a cochair of the NASEM committee, said: "If you put Black and brown Some might argue further, based on Deborah Hellman's theory (Hellman 2008, 35-36), that the act of favoring racial minorities in vaccine allocation per se is morally wrong racial discrimination, since within the context of the history of unethical human experimentations on Black people, the convention of U.S. society determines the meaning of this type of act, such that it is considered demeaning or disrespectful to Blacks in this society.…”