Is and Ought

Wright, G. H. von

doi:10.1007/978-94-009-4454-1_3

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…The very enterprise of representing norms in logical language can be questioned with the argument that normative statements are neither true nor false -so then how can they be modelled in truth-functional logic? For von Wright (1986), ideal worlds are a means to solve this metaphysical problem. In his view, deontic logic is "not concerned with logical relations between prescriptions (norms) but with logical relations between the ideal states the descriptions of which are implicit in norms."…”

Section: The Metaphysical Issuementioning

confidence: 99%

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Ideal Worlds — Wishful Thinking in Deontic Logic

Hansson

2006

Stud Logica

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The ideal world semantics of standard deontic logic identifies our obligations with how we would act in an ideal world. However, to act as if one lived in an ideal world is bad moral advice, associated with wishful thinking rather than well-considered moral deliberation. Ideal world semantics gives rise to implausible logical principles, and the metaphysical arguments that have been put forward in its favour turn out to be based on a too limited view of truth-functional representation. It is argued that ideal world semantics should be given up in favour of other, more plausible uses of possible worlds for modelling normative subject-matter.

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Section: The Metaphysical Issuementioning

confidence: 99%

“…(Bengt Hansson 1969) Deontic logicians often treat ideal worlds not only as a convenient construction but as the real subject-matter of deontic logic. Hence, according to von Wright (1986):…”

Section: Ideal Worlds Sufficiency (Iws)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideal Worlds — Wishful Thinking in Deontic Logic

Hansson

2006

Stud Logica

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“…Bertrand Russell initially subscribed to Moore's proposition, but later he argued against it. In our times, the American philosopher John Searle (1964) has actually claimed to have derived an "ought" from a fact within the context of human experience, but then von Wright (1986) critically analysed his argument and found it to be fallacious. MacIntyre (1959) claims that Hume himself contravened his own position, but not all agree with MacIntyre's analysis.…”

Section: Brief Historical Philosophical Background Of the Fact-value mentioning

confidence: 99%

Facts, Values and the Psychology of the Human Person

Giorgi

2006

Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology

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The notion of value neutrality has been a contentious issue within the human and social sciences for some time. In this paper, some of the philosophical and scientific bases for the confusion surrounding the fact-value dichotomy are covered and the discrepancy between how psychology studies values and expresses them is noted. The sense of value neutrality is clarified historically and the clarified meaning of the term applied to some qualitative data demonstrating in what sense values may be expressed in psychology. The position is upheld that psychology as a human science intentionally should not be absolutely value free in the sense that human reality has to be studied in a non-reductionistic manner and thus methods of study must be respectful of the full ethical sense of humanness. This is simply meeting the phenomenological requirement of "fidelity to the phenomenon". However, psychology can be value free in the historical sense of the term properly understood because it refers to the fact that the personal values of the scientists ought not to be conflated with scientific findings. The discussion of values takes place primarily within the context of science, where the problem of value neutrality emerged, but it is acknowledged that non-scientific approaches to value have merit and can also be compelling. In the English language the word (value) is used in a somewhat loose and fluctuating way. Philosophers and social scientists concerned with value questions have long recognized the need for a more precise terminology to facilitate the exact formulations needed in scholarly and scientific contexts. But this desideratum seems to be the only point of agreement .... [A]ll their positive efforts have failed. (p. 1) The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the publishers.

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“…Putting it the way of Rolston (1988), "value is the generic term for any positive predicate", or, in other words, a statement about a general characteristic of the world as it ought to be. The concept of norm belongs to the same realm of the "description of an alternative, ideal world" (Von Wright, 1986), but is usually regarded as more specific than the values that ground them; Kuypers (1979) mentions "criteria for evaluation, prescriptions" as forms that norms may take.…”

Section: Figure 3dmentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental Science Theory - Concepts and Methods in a One-World, Problem-Oriented Paradigm

Groot¹

1992

Studies in Environmental Science

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Is and Ought

Cited by 3 publications

References 3 publications

Ideal Worlds — Wishful Thinking in Deontic Logic

Ideal Worlds — Wishful Thinking in Deontic Logic

Facts, Values and the Psychology of the Human Person

Environmental Science Theory - Concepts and Methods in a One-World, Problem-Oriented Paradigm

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