Is Agent-Neutral Deontology Possible?

Abstract

t is commonly held that all deontological moral theories are agent-relative in the sense that they give each agent a special concern that she does not perform acts of a certain type rather than a general concern with the actions of all agents. Recently, Tom Dougherty has challenged this orthodoxy by arguing that agent-neutral deontology is possible.1 His argument is simple: he posits a moral rule that he claims is both agent-neutral and deontological. In this article I show that the rule Dougherty posits cannot be both agent-neutral and deontological. The problem is that the rule has several possible interpretations and, although on some interpretations it is an agent-neutral rule, and on some interpretations it is a deontological rule, there are no interpretations in which it is both agent-neutral and deontological. I conclude by considering an alternative rule inspired by Dougherty's approach that looks like it might be both agent-neutral and deontological and showing that it too fails because it has core commitments that are incompatible with deontology.

The fundamental divisions in ethics

“…8 Among those who emphasize its importance are Nagel (1970Nagel ( , 1986, Parfit (1984), McNaughton and Rawling (1991), Dreier (1993), Hurka (2003), and Portmore (2013). 9 For further discussion of this point see Dreier (1993), Dougherty (2013), Nair (2014), Hammerton (2017), and Cox and Hammerton (2021). 10 See Parfit (1984), Broome (1991), Dreier (2018), andHammerton (2020) for further discussion.…”

“…However, some have rejected this view, holding that theories which always require agents to maximize the good count as consequentialist regardless of the explanatory relationship they posit between the right and the good. 27 In favour of the orthodox view is the fact that all paradigmatic examples of consequentialism 22 See Hammerton (2017) for criticism. 23 See Finnis (1980) and Kamm (2007).…”

Deontic Constraints are Maximizing Rules

“…Therefore, I conclude that however one decides to formulate a constraint on promise-breaking, it will be some variant of rules (1)-(4). 5 I cannot back this claim up with an impossibility proof showing that it is impossible to produce a deontic constraint on promisebreaking that is not a variant of rules (1)-(4). Impossibility proofs are notoriously difficult.…”

Why deontologists should reject agent-relative value and embrace agent-relative accountability

“…Korsgaard is mainly concerned with showing that deontological reasoning is not purely agent-relative or subjective. This is less bold than Dougherty's (2013) claim that deontological ethics can be formulated in an agent-neutral way (for a critique, see Hammerton 2017). By contrast, I consider traditional deontological ethics, including Kant's, as agent-relative due to assumptions of accountability, but claim that they need not employ agent-relative values.…”