Iris Murdoch, privacy, and the limits of moral testimony

Mason, Cathy

doi:10.1111/ejop.12721

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…18. For more on Murdoch's notion of privacy, see Hopwood (2017), Wiseman (2020) and Mason (2022). hard to see how there could be such differing moral concepts without some such concepts being inaccurate or simply incomplete.…”

Section: Complicating the Picturementioning

confidence: 99%

Reconceiving Murdochian Realism

Mason

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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It can be tempting to read Iris Murdoch as subscribing to the same position as standard contemporary moral realists. Her language is often similar to theirs and they share some key commitments, most importantly the rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, it is a mistake to assume that her realism amounts to the same thing theirs does. In this paper I offer a sketch of her alternative conception of realism, which centres on the idea that truth and reality are fundamentally ethical concepts. For Murdoch, I suggest, realism is a matter of doing justice to the objects one is confronted with—something that cannot be understood except in ethical terms.

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Section: Complicating the Picturementioning

confidence: 99%

Reconceiving Murdochian Realism

Mason

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…But she did not develop a systematic account of perspective and would have been skeptical that something like perspectives can be shared interpersonally. See Mason (2022). Tiberius is interested in the role of perspective in the prudential realm: adopting a perspective is a matter of structuring one's attention in light of a particular value or commitment one holds.…”

Section: Trying To Make Sense Of Thingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry

Sliwa

2023

Philos Phenomenol Research

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We are frequently confronted with moral situations that are unsettling, confusing, disorienting. We try to come to grips with them. When we do so, we engage in a distinctive type of moral inquiry: hermeneutical inquiry. Its aim is to make sense of our situation. What is it to make sense of one's situation? Hermeneutical inquiry is part of our everyday moral experience. Understanding its nature and its place in moral epistemology is important. Yet, I argue, that existing accounts of moral inquiry do not give us the resources to do so. This paper develops a positive account of hermeneutical inquiry. I argue that when we engage in hermeneutical inquiry, we search for an apt perspective on our situation.

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Love's realism: Iris Murdoch and the importance of being human

Jamieson

2024

European J of Philosophy

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Defenders of two Rationality Views of love—the Qualities View and the Personhood View—have drawn on Iris Murdoch's philosophical writings to highlight a connection between love and a “realistic” perspective on the beloved. Murdoch does not inform the basic structure of these views—she is rather introduced as a supplement who shows that in love, we pay accurate, nuanced, unguarded, and unflinching attention to the other. In this paper, I contend that these authors have failed to see that Murdoch offers a distinct view of love and is inappropriate to enlist as an ally. This is in large part because they have missed the full sense of what Murdoch means by connecting love and realism. I contend that for Murdoch, to love someone means seeing them in light of a realistic vision of what it means to be human; this includes an appreciation of the limits of freedom, the formative influence of personal history, and the nature and extent of our differences from one another. This helps us to see why Murdoch variously describes loving attention as realistic, compassionate, tolerant, and extremely difficult. It also sheds light on some important and familiar ways that we criticize one another's grounds for love.

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Iris Murdoch, privacy, and the limits of moral testimony

Cited by 3 publications

References 12 publications

Reconceiving Murdochian Realism

Reconceiving Murdochian Realism

Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry

Love's realism: Iris Murdoch and the importance of being human

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