iRep: indirect reciprocity reputation based efficient content delivery in BT-like systems

Wei, Xianglin; Chen, Ming; Tang, Chaogang; Bai, Huali; Zhang, Guomin; Wang, Zhanfeng

doi:10.1007/s11235-013-9715-0

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…In centralized RP2P systems, X T×N is usually collected and stored by a centralized facility, such as the tracker servers or the central server in Maze. In contrast, X T×N can be collected and calculated by each peer respectively in RP2P systems with decentralized reputation management scheme [2] [15]. Hence, at least in some way, we can always get X T×N .…”

Section: Reputation Matrixmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…free-riders) on both original BitTorrent (OBT) and BitTorrent system with a typical incentive scheme named EigenTrust [2] (EBT). The experiments are conducted on the simulator developed by Legout et al [18][19], moreover, we implement EigenTrust on it, replace its homogeneous assumption of peers' upload capacities with heterogeneous one [15] and add an information collection module to it. To make the result more general， we investigate the influence of free-riders under two scenarios: in the first scenario, peers arrive in flash crowd fashion (i.e.…”

Section: The Influence Of Malicious Peers On the Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the sake of simplicity, the flash crowd scenario and the exponential decreasing scenario will be referred to as FCS and EDS respectively in the following analysis. Other settings can be referred to [15] [19]. In this simulation, the download time of a peer is defined as its download completion time minus its arrival time, and the Average Download Time (ADT) is defined as the average value of all peers' download times.…”

Section: The Influence Of Malicious Peers On the Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

SMART: A Subspace based Malicious Peers Detection algorithm for P2P Systems

Wei¹,

Jiang²,

Chen³

et al. 2022

Int. j. commun. netw. inf. secur.

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In recent years, reputation management schemes have been proposed as promising solutions to alleviate the blindness during peer selection in distributed P2P environment where malicious peers coexist with honest ones. They indeed provide incentives for peers to contribute more resources to the system and thus promote the whole system performance. But few of them have been implemented practically since they still suffer from various security threats, such as collusion, Sybil attack and so on. Therefore, how to detect malicious peers plays a critical role in the successful work of these mechanisms, and it will also be our focus in this paper. Firstly, we define malicious peers and show their influence on the system performance. Secondly, based on Multiscale Principal Component Analysis (MSPCA) and control chart, a Subspace based MAlicious peeRs deTecting algorithm (SMART) is brought forward. SMART first reconstructs the original reputation matrix based on subspace method, and then finds malicious peers out based on Shewhart control chart. Finally, simulation results indicate that SMART can detect malicious peers efficiently and accurately.

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Section: Reputation Matrixmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Influence Of Malicious Peers On the Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Influence Of Malicious Peers On the Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

SMART: A Subspace based Malicious Peers Detection algorithm for P2P Systems

Wei¹,

Jiang²,

Chen³

et al. 2022

Int. j. commun. netw. inf. secur.

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show abstract

“…Other studies formulate game models assuming that players receive compensation in return for caching specific content [18,19]. An evolutionarily stable cooperation strategy in a peer-to-peer (P2P) environment using BitTorrent has been proposed under the name of iRep [20]; it consists in first enabling connections with neighbor agents of higher trust values, as derived from prior content transfers.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect of User Mobility upon Trust Building among Autonomous Content Routers in an Information‐Centric Network

Konorski

Grochowski

2018

Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing

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The capability of proactive in-network caching and sharing of content is one of the most important features of an information-centric network (ICN). We describe an ICN model featuring autonomous agents controlling the content routers. Such agents are unlikely to share cached content with other agents without an incentive to do so. To stimulate cooperation between agents, we adopt a reputation and trust building scheme that is able to explicitly account for both objective current content availability and subjective willingness to cooperate. The scheme is further complemented with a so-called one-time goodwill mechanism introduced to avoid penalizing agents failures to provide temporarily unavailable content. In a simulated ICN environment under a modified Random Waypoint user mobility model, we investigate the resiliency of the reputation and trust building scheme to subversion, that is, strategic (selfish or malicious) agents acquiring higher trust values than honest ones, for varying user mobility scenarios. The scheme proves resilient in low-mobility scenarios, while increased user mobility is shown to have a negative effect. The one-time goodwill mechanism partly remedies this for high-mobility scenarios. We validate the results by comparison with an existing reputation and trust building scheme and with an alternative user mobility model.

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“…The authors of [28] based on the P2Passisted to investigate efficient and incentive-compatible resource allocation mechanism in content delivery systems. The authors of [29] based efficient content delivery propose indirect reciprocity reputation in BT-like systems. The authors of [30] based on social relation investigate a resource allocation algorithm for Video Streaming Services over P2P network.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Public Goods Allocation in P2P Networks

2015

KSII TIIS

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This paper presents a game theoretic approach to analyze the public goods (PGs) allocation in peer-to-peer (p2p) networks. In order to reduce the free-riders and promote the cooperation among peers, we propose an incentive mechanism with cooperationbased game theory. In this paper, we regarded the contributed resources by cooperators as public goods (PGs). We also build the PGs allocation in P2P networks to be the optimization problem, and the optimal solution of PGs allocation satisfies the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium. Firstly, based on the subscriber mechanism, we analyze the feasibility and prove the validity, which can achieve Nash equilibrium. However, this strategy cannot meet to Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium as the free-riders do not pay with their private goods for consuming the PGs. Secondly, based on the Walker mechanism, we analyze the feasibility and prove the validity for the same allocation problem, which meets to Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium and achieves Pareto efficiency within cooperative game. Simulations show that the proposed walker mechanism can significantly improve the network performance of throughout, and effectively alleviate free-riding problem in P2P networks.

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iRep: indirect reciprocity reputation based efficient content delivery in BT-like systems

Cited by 5 publications

References 17 publications

SMART: A Subspace based Malicious Peers Detection algorithm for P2P Systems

SMART: A Subspace based Malicious Peers Detection algorithm for P2P Systems

Effect of User Mobility upon Trust Building among Autonomous Content Routers in an Information‐Centric Network

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Public Goods Allocation in P2P Networks

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