Iran‐Saudi Rivalry in Africa: Implications for Regional Stability

Bahi, Riham

doi:10.1111/mepo.12374

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Consequently, the Saudi approach to the HOA was based on economic and financial aid, and on religious proselytism often referred to as "quiet diplomacy" (Richter 2014). Specifically, new impetus was given to a programme of public diplomacy launched in the 1970s and aimed at spreading Wahhabism through the opening of Quranic schools (madrasa) and training courses for imams (Bahi 2018).…”

Section: Enlargement Of Regional Boundaries Across the Red Sea After ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fluctuating Saudi and Emirati Alignment Behaviours in the Horn of Africa

Donelli

Dentice

2020

The International Spectator

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The overthrow of Omar al-Bashir after three decades of rule has brought to light a dynamic that has been present for years: an interweaving of political, economic and security issues between the states of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf monarchies. Since 2011, the most active powers are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which seek political support to counter both Iran's influence and the growing Turkish presence. The two Gulf monarchies' search for alignments with African counterparts has favoured the continuous reshuffling of alliances with direct effects on the local actors' strategic choices. These dynamics need to be considered to understand the determinants behind the currently increasing instability in the Red Sea area.

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Section: Enlargement Of Regional Boundaries Across the Red Sea After ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fluctuating Saudi and Emirati Alignment Behaviours in the Horn of Africa

Donelli

Dentice

2020

The International Spectator

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“…These efforts had largely been successful at first, as most of the abovementioned states loosened their ties with Tehran, making it more difficult, for instance, for Iranian vessels to navigate the Red Sea. 27 Also, the UAE now runs military bases in Eritrea (Assab) and Somaliland (Berbera), while Saudi Arabia is about to open its first one in Djibouti. 28 Yet the conflict constellations in the Red Sea are complex and rapidly shift.…”

Section: States At the Saudi Ministry Of Foreignmentioning

confidence: 99%