Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan

Abstract

Since 1979, Iran's objectives in Afghanistan have changed as Afghanistan's domestic landscape changed. Still, Iran has consistently sought to see a stable and independent Afghanistan, with Herat as a buffer zone and with a Tehran-friendly government in Kabul, a government that reflects the rich ethnic diversity of the country. Toward those and other goals, Iran has created “spheres of influence” inside Afghanistan. During the Soviet occupation (1979-88), Iran created an “ideological sphere of influence” by empowering the Shi'ites. Iran then created a “political sphere of influence” by unifying the Dari/Persian-speaking minorities, who ascended to power. Iranian policies added fuel to the ferocious civil war in the 1990s. Astonishingly slow to recognize the threat posed by the Taliban, Iran helped create a “sphere of resistance” to counter the “Kabul-Islamabad-Riyadh” axis by supporting the Northern Alliance. Since the liberation of Afghanistan, Iran has also established an “economic sphere of influence” by engaging in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Today, Iran's goals are to pressure the Afghan government to distance itself from Washington, and for Iran to become the hub for the transit of goods and services between the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, Central Asia, India, and China. While Iran has been guilty of extremism and adventurism in some critical aspects of its foreign policy, its overall Afghan policy has contributed more to moderation and stability than to extremism and instability.

Repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran: a shelter profile study

“…It is estimated that 900,000 people will need shelter assistance in Afghanistan in 2018 and among them are 440,000 returnees (United States Agency for International Development [USAID] 2017). The literature suggests that lack of access to a durable shelter is one of the main reasons for the secondary displacement of Afghan returnees (Abbasi-Shavazi et al 2005;Barr and Sanei 2013;Macdonald 2011;Schmeidl 2009;Milani 2006;Simpson et al 2017). Estimates show that on average around 15% of the registered returnees in Afghanistan are forced to secondary displacement (UNHCR 2012).…”

“…Iran hosts the largest urban refugee population in the world; 951,142 documented Afghan refugees live in this country, and around 97% of them live in urban and semi-urban areas (UNHCR 2015a, b). Besides documented refugees, there are between half a million to two million undocumented Afghans in Iran who either arrived after the restriction of new Amayesh cards or could not afford to renew their cards (Azizi et al 2017;Koepke 2011;Marchand et al 2014;Milani 2006;Rajaee 2000;Scalettaris 2010).…”

Política externa: as relações internacionais em mudança

“…Apesar dos momentos de tensão entre Teerão e Moscovo, nomeadamente durante a invasão Soviética no Afeganistão (Milan, 2006: 235-246) e durante a guerra na Chechénia, os dois estados viram benefí-cios numa cooperação estratégica. Um dos objectivos centrais era limitar a presença norte americana no Golfo Pérsico e no Mar Cáspio (Lowe and Spencer, 2006: 40-43) (Calabrese, 1998;Herzig, 2004: 507).…”

U.S.‐Iran Engagement Through Afghanistan

“…86 Iran has demonstrated its commitment to Afghan stability and development. According to Milani, 87 Approximately 4 percent of Iran's exports comprise trade with Afghanistan, about 11 percent of Afghanistan's imports. 88 In addition to strategic interests in the development of Afghanistan, Iran has security concerns relating to narcotics, refugees and violent extremists.…”

“…Iran has security concerns regarding terrorism and the re-emergence of an extremist Sunni state in Afghanistan reminiscent of that of the Taliban. 93 In time Iran's leaders reject the U.S. olive branch, they weaken the Islamic Republic's standing in the international community as well as among its Iranian constituency. Formulating and executing a plan for diplomatic engagement with Tehran will be more difficult than reaching out to Iran with promises of "mutual respect."…”