Involuntary Sins

Adams, Robert

doi:10.2307/2184713

Cited by 306 publications

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“…The remainder of the paper suggests how the original assumption, that one can be responsible only for the voluntary, gained its plausibility. 1 Robert Adams argues against this assumption, providing counter-examples, in Adams (1985). For a more recent argument against the assumption, see Smith (2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Responsibility for believing

2006

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Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one's take on the world and one's place in it) also guarantees that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Responsibility for believing

2006

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“…16 Adams (1985) also attacks the CC on the grounds that it distorts our usual moral practices, in particular the practice of blaming people for their "morally objectionable states of mind" (p. 4) such as unjust anger, jealousy, hatred, and even "corrupt beliefs as well as wrong desires" (idem), over which it's assumed we usually lack voluntary control. I don't have the space to discuss Adams's suggestive paper, so I will just note one obvious problem with his argument: one may well accept that our practices involve the moral assessment of people's states of mind and, more generally, the assessment of people's characters, and yet deny that such assessments amount to judgments of moral responsibility.…”

Section: A Different Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility

Hiller

2016

Manuscrito

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Abstract:In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. I argue that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent-i.e., being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasonsdissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren't at odds.

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“…53 52 Chuard and Southwood (ibid.). Adams (1985) famously argues that you can be responsible for emotions that are not voluntary. 53 As an anonymous referee pointed out, the fact that the psychopath is not blameworthy for his lack of remorse does not obviously entail that it is not the case that the psychopath ought to feel remorse.…”

Section: The 'Ought Implies Can' Argument For (P1)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

McHugh

2011

Erkenn

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We tend to prescribe and appraise doxastic states in terms that are broadly deontic. According to a simple argument, such prescriptions and appraisals are improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are voluntary. One strategy for resisting this argument, recently endorsed by a number of philosophers, is to claim that our doxastic states are in fact voluntary (This strategy has been pursued by Steup 2008; Weatherson 2008). In this paper I argue that this strategy is neither successful nor necessary. Our doxastic states are not voluntary in any interesting sense. But once we see why our doxastic states are not voluntary, we can also see that there is no apparent reason to think that deontic prescriptions and appraisals-epistemic ones, at any rate-presuppose doxastic voluntarism. Indeed, there is good reason to deny that they do so. Finally, I diagnose the misleading attraction of the idea that what I call 'epistemic deontology' presupposes doxastic voluntarism.

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Involuntary Sins

Cited by 306 publications

References 0 publications

Responsibility for believing

Responsibility for believing

How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility

Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

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